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The Last One Hundred Years: The Incredible
Retreat of Law from the Regulation of Marriage
KatherineShaw Spaht*
I. INTRODUCTION

Over the last one hundred years the law has retreated' from a
confidently moral view ofmarriage.2 This retreat ofthe law includes
areas such as entry into marriage, the content of marriage, and the
grounds for its termination. As a consequence, the retreat has
permitted the parties themselves to choose to enter the relationship of
marriage without the information that used to be required, to define
Copyright 2003, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.

Jules F. and Frances L. Landry Professor of Law, LSU Law Center. This
article is dedicated to my colleague W. Lee Hargrave who died on November 15,
2002. (See Appendix.)
1. At least one other author has referred to this retreat as the
"disestablishment" of the institution of marriage. See Ann Laquer Estin, Marriage
andBelonging, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1690 (2002), reviewing Nancy F. Cott's Public
Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation (2000). "By the twentieth century,
with the character ofthe national polity well established, marriage was effectively
disestablished, as laws enforcing gender roles and creating barriers to divorce and
nonmarital childbearing were abandoned." Estin, 100 Mich. L. Rev. at 1691.
2. See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of
American FamilyLaw, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803 (1985).
An excellent book that traces the conception ofmarriage in the West as reflected
in various religious traditions, its influence on law, and ultimately the influence of
the Enlightenment and its secular view of marriage and family is John Witte, Jr.'s
From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion, and Law in the Western Tradition
(1997):
This book, From Sacrament to Contract,shows how religion greatly
influenced family law in Europe and America. Although this influence is
all but forgotten, not only by contemporary churches but also by the
present-day legal profession, it is essential in understanding the
contemporary debate over the family. Few ofus understand how medieval
Catholic canon law shaped the marriage policies of the Protestant
Reformation, how Luther and the Wittenberg reformers not only built on
but also amended canon law to shape the legal marriage policies of
Protestant Europe, how Calvin helped create the marriage laws of Geneva
and Calvinist areas in Scotland, England, and America, and how these
traditions have competed since the Enlightenment with an increasingly
contractual and secular view of marriage and family.
See also a condensed version of the book in John Witte, Jr., The Meanings of
Marriage, First Things 30-41 (2002), as well as a short essay with the same topic
by Professor Witte, An Apt and Cheerful Conversation on Marriage,The Sixth
Distinguished Faculty Lecture at Emory University (Feb. 7, 2001).
See also Albert W. Alschuler, Law Without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy
of Justice Holmes (2002).
*
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the content of their marriage and to determine its day-to-day
regulation. Even more remarkably, the determination of if and when
a marriage should end now rests in the decision-making process of
only one of the two parties; 3 in other words, even without the legal
protection given to simple contracts.4 Thus, it is both precise and
accurate to refer to current no-fault divorce law as "unilateral
repudiation."
Although this article traces only the relevant history ofthe retreat
of Louisiana law in its regulation of marriage, the Louisiana
experience illustrates what has happened throughout the United
Not surprisingly, people in Western countries have
States.'
concluded that marriage is a private relationship which the law has no
right to regulate and whose consequences affect only the parties to the
marriage, not the general public, not even their own children. The
singular and most crucial purpose of marriage as the incubator of
future civilization has been replaced in Americans' cultural
imagination by a very different purpose. No longer does the general
public intuit that the married couple is the instrumentality charged
with civilization's most burdensome, time-consuming but
indispensable task, the acculturation of children.' The new purpose
3. Under no-fault divorce laws throughout the country, one spouse may seek
and obtain a divorce by alleging that irreconcilable differences exist or that there
has been an irreparable breakdown of the marriage. No state adopting no-fault
divorce has required actual proof that the differences are irreconcilable or that the
marriage has broken down. In Louisiana, one spouse may simply file an action for
divorce and then wait for one hundred eighty days after service of the petition and
seek a divorce by rule to show cause. The only defense to the action for divorce is
reconciliation. See La. Civ. Code arts. 102, 105.
4. La. Civ. Code art. 1983: "Contracts have the effect of law for the parties
and may be dissolved only through the consent of the parties or on grounds
provided by law.. .. "
5. In his dedicatory address at Ave Maria School of Law, Francis Cardinal
George, O.M.I., essentially makes the same point: "Yet, in the name ofindividual
'privacy,'"autonomy,' and'freedom,' important protections offamily life have been
erased from the law." Francis Cardinal George, Law and Culture 13, Address at
Ave Maria School of Law (Mar. 21, 2002). Of course, in Western Europe the
retreat has been hastier and more complete.
6. "Whatever the changes in lifestyles, the real purpose ofgiving special legal
status to marriage and family remains what ithas always been: The provision ofour
first-choice setting for the procreation and raising of children." Harry D. Krause,
Marriagefor the New Millennium: Heterosexual,Same-Sex, orNot at All?, 34
Fain. L.Q. 271,299 (Summer 2000). But see Maggie Gallagher, What is Marriage
For?The PublicPurposesofMarriageLaw, 62 La. L. Rev. 773 (2002) taking issue
with other conclusions in Professor Krause's article. Further, John Witte, Jr. in
From Sacramentto Contract,supra note 2, describes the benefit children obtain
from marriage in the following terms: "Marriage enhances the life of the child by
providing it with a chrysalis ofnurture and love, with a highly individualized form
of socialization and education. It might take a whole village to raise a child

2003]

KATHERINE SHA W SPAHT

245

of marriage is best described as the public recognition of a private,
sexually intimate, and privileged relationship created for the
satisfaction, support, nurturance and fulfillment of the two parties.7
The state of current law supports and reinforces such a perception.
The effect of law on culture and culture on law continues to be a
matter of extensive scholarly debate.s
Law and culture stand in a complex dialectical relationship.
Neither comes first; neither comes last. Law contributes
massively to the formation of culture; culture influences and
shapes the law. Inescapably, inevitably, law and culture stand
in a mutually informing, formative, and reinforcing
relationship. For this reason and many others, the liberal ideal
of governmental "neutrality" on contested cultural-moral
issues, allegedly leaving everyone "free" to pursue their own
private visions of the good and thus attain personal
fulfillment, is an illusion. It amounts either to non-sense, or
it masks an ideology of social engineering.9
In this article, the precise issue concerns not whether the
enactment of law can change a nation's culture, such as the 1960s
civil rights legislation has done,'" but whether the repeal of laws can
properly, but it takes a marriage to make one .... " Witte, supranote 2, at 219.
Virtually all social science data supports the proposition that children raised in
an intact married family benefit economically, socially, academically, physically,
and emotionally, especially when compared to children of divorce or children
reared by single mothers. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant
Marriage:SocialAnalysis and LegalImplications,59 La. L. Rev. 63 (1998) and
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Forthe Sake ofthe Children: Recapturingthe Meaningof
Marriage,73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1547 (1998), articles in which this data appears.
7. That marriage does benefit the two spouses is the subject ofLinda S. Waite
& Maggie Gallagher's book, The Case for Marriage: Why Married People are
Happier, Healthier and Better Off (2000). The authors collect and synthesize the
social science data that supports the proposition that marriage is good for men and
for women. John Witte, Jr. in his book, From Sacrament to Contract, describes the
effect ofmarriage on the spouses in the following manner: "Marriage enhances the
life of a man and a woman by providing them with a conmiunity of caring and
sharing, ofstability and support, of nurture and welfare ."
Witte, supranote 2,
at 219.
8. In Katherine Shaw Spaht, Forthe Sake ofthe Children: Recapturingthe
Meaning ofMarriage,73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1547, 1559-63 (1998), the author
discusses marriage and the law and the latter's relationship to the former, citing the
philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (73 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1559 n. 54) and the
opinions of such diverse individuals as Mary Ann Glendon (73 Notre Dame L. Rev.
at 1559-61) and James Boyd White, who considered law a branch of rhetoric (73
Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1561 n.64).
9. Francis Cardinal George, supranote 5, at 10.
10. Id. at 7:
The Brown court knew that law-whether just or unjust-functions as a
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have such an effect. Does the repeal of laws which regulated sexual
morality by channeling the sexual expression of a man and a woman
to and within marriage" and which protected that relationship once
formed 2 change the inherent nature of the institution? Law does
represent the formal expression of society's collective interest. As
Francis Cardinal George expresses it: ". . . law is the primary carrier
of culture in this pluralistic society; law is the forger of our national
identity and of our collective sense of rightand wrong.'1 3 When it
withdraws by repealing legislation which previously expressed its
fundamental concern for marriage, does that withdrawal communicate
the abdication of the public's interest in marriage? Does that
withdrawal convey to citizens that marriage is indeed a purely private
matter 4 and no longer an institution of significant public concern
deserving of privilege and protection? This article examines those
questions and reaches the conclusion, not surprisingly, that the
teacher. It is capable of instigating great cultural change; and it is capable
of profoundly reinforcing a status quo. The Justices knew that
segregation, as a cultural practice, would not end so long as law testified,
and thus taught, in season and out, that black and white are unequal. They
fell into neither ofthe two errors I mentioned, that of believing that legal
reform is sufficient to overcome social evils or that ofsupposing that such
reform has no significant role to play in the matter.... People-black and
white-tended to internalize the norms of laws protecting patterns ofracial
segregation. The law called forth the ideology by which it was defended,
thus
e rationalizing and deepening the racism that brought it into being in
I t f ~rst p l c . SOne 61Me five purposes of family law is the "channelling" function: the
law creates or (more often) supports social institutions, which are thought to serve
desirable ends. Carl E. Schneider, The ChannellingFunction in.FamilyLaw, 20
Hofstra L. Rev. 495 (1992).
12. Id. The purpose, of course, was for the protection of potential offspring.
The "protective" function of family law protects citizens against harms done them
by other citizens.
13. Francis Cardinal George, supranote 5, at 19.
14. Witte, supranote 2, at 209:
Since the early 1960s, American reformers have been pressing the
Enlightenment contractarian model of marriage to the more radical
conclusions that [John Stuart] Mill and others had suggested. The same
Enlightenment ideals of individualism, freedom, equality and privacy,
which had earlier driven reforms of traditional marriage law, are now
being increasingly used to reject traditional marriage laws altogether. The
early Enlightenment ideals of marriage as a permanent contractual union
designed for the sake ofmutual love, procreation, and protection is slowly
giving way to a new reality of marriage as a 'terminal sexual contract'
designed for the gratification of the individual parties.
The author then cites the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act as reflecting these
changes. See also James Q. Wilson, The Marriage Problem: How Our Culture Has
Weakened Families (2002), in which the author argues that the seeds of the
destruction of the family were planted during the Enlightenment.
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abandonment by law ofthe regulation ofmarriage played a significant
role in changing society's understanding of marriage and its public
character.
II.
A. Legal Regulation ofEntry into Marriage,Historically
15

1. The Promise ofMarriage

Louisiana has always recognized that the promise ofmarriage, the
engagement, is a contract and subject to the ordinary remedies
provided for breach of contract. 6 The promise of marriage assumes
an exchange ofpromises by the prospective bride and the prospective
groom.' 7 Article 1934 (1870) recognized that breach of a contract of
marriage would result in damages rather than specific performance"
15. SeegenerallyHarriet S. Daggett, Legal Essays on Family Law, The Action
for Breach of the Marriage Promise, 39-100 (1935) and Harry Cohen, Note,
Obligations- Breach ofPromiseto Mary,24 Tul. L. Rev. 501 (1950).
This promise ofmarriage is not what historically was referred to as the marriage
contract. The marriage contract
is a contract entered into by the intended spouses primarily to adopt a
matrimonial regime, that is to say, a plan of order respecting their
patrimonial rights and obligations during marriage including a rule on the
amount each spouse shall contribute to the expenses ofthe marriage. The
marriage contract may include donations made by either spouse to the
other in contemplation of marriage, and even third persons may join in the
marriage contract in order to make donations in favor of one spouse or
both and his or their descendants.
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana Practice Series: Family Law in Louisiana 73-74
(2000). See also discussion in Morgan v. Yarborough, 5 La. Ann. 316 (1850)
(court distinguishes between two contracts).
16. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288, 179 So. 430 (1938); Hurry v.
Hurry, 144 La. 877, 81 So. 378 (1918); Zwikel v. Zwikel, 154 La. 532, 97 So. 850
(1923); Stallings v. Stallings, 177 La. 488, 148 So. 687(1933); Cormier v. Cormier,
185 La. 968, 171 So. 93 (1936); Smith v. Braun, 37 La. Ann. 225 (1885); Morgan
v. Yarborough, 5 La. Ann. 316 (1850). See also Katherine Shaw Spaht,
Symposium-FamilyLaw, 44 La. L. Rev. 1545 (1984); Mary Bamforth Hubert, The
Annulment ofMarriagesin Louisiana,24 Tul. L. Rev. 217 (1949).
17. "To all contracts there must be at least two parties; one who does, or
engages to do or not to do, another to whom the engagement is made ... It is called
a bilateralcontract.., when the parties expressly enter into mutual engagements."
La. Civ. Code art. 1765 (1870). See La. Civ. Code art. 1906 (1984).
18. La. Civ. Code art. 1927 (1870):
In ordinary cases, the breach of such a contract [an obligation to do, or not
to do] entitles the party aggrieved only to damages, but where this would
be an inadequate compensation, and the party has the power ofperforming
the contract, he may be constrained to a specific performance by means
prescribed in the laws which regulate the practice of the courts.
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and that the greatest damage suffered would not ordinarily be
pecuniary loss. Therefore, as a specific example of the breach of a
special type of contract 9 that would permit the recovery of nonpecuniary damages, the Civil Code enumerated "a promise of
marriage.. . "among its other examples. 2' The action, however, was
considered to be legally personal and not heritable by virtue of its
very intimate nature.2' Consistent with Civil Code principles, the
jurisprudence permitted the recovery of damages "which result from
injury to feelings and reputation as well as material damages ....22
However, the promisee of a promise ofmarriage could not retain the
engagement ring as a form of liquidated damages since the Civil
Code expressly recognized the scenario as an example of a failure of
cause: "Every donation made in favor of marriage falls, if the
marriage does not take place. 2 13 Notice that the gift contemplated is
one made "in favor of marriage," the relationship or institution, the,
cause 24 being the marriage rather than the donee.
The same jurisprudence, however, recognized the application of
other not so obvious contract principles whenever considering a claim
for breach of a promise to marry. For example, if the plaintiff could
prove "seduction" by the defendant, the amount ofdamages awarded
Interestingly enough, under Spanish law when ecclesiastical tribunals
governed matters of marriage, the tribunal "would take cognizance of a
breach of promise, and punish the party until he consented to fulfil the
promise ..."
Morgan v. Yarborough, 5 La. Ann. 316, 321 (1850).
19. "Where the contract has for its object the gratification of some intellectual
enjoyment, whether in religion, morality or taste, or some convenience or other
legal gratification, although these are not appreciated in money by the parties, yet
damages are due for their breach ....
" La. Civ. Code art. 1934(3) (1870).
20. Other examples in La. Civ. Code art. 1934(3) (1870) included "a contract
for a religious or charitable foundation, . . . or an engagement for a work of some
of the fine arts ....
"
21. La. Civ. Code art. 1997 (1870):
An obligation is strictly personal, when none but the obligee can enforce
the performance, or when it can be enforced only against the obligor.
It is heritable when the heirs and assigns of the one party may enforce the
performance against the heirs of the other.
La. Civ. Code art. 1999 (1870): "Every obligation shall be deemed heritable as
to both parties, unless the contrary be specially expressed, or necessarily implied
from the nature of the contract."
For a case interpreting and applying these articles to a promise of marriage, see
Johnson v. Levy, 118 La. 447, 43 So. 46 (1907).
See also La. Civ. Code arts. 1765, 1766 (1984).
22. Supra note 15, at 504. See Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So.
447 (1927); Johnson v. Levy, 118 La. 446, 43 So. 46 (1907).
23. La. Civ. Code art. 1740 (1870). This article still remains in the Civil Code.
See alsoLa. Civ. Code arts. 1896-1898 (1870).
24. See text of La. Civ. Code 1825 (1870) at infra note 28.
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to the plaintiff exceeded the usual award because the damages
suffered by the plaintiffwere considered "aggravated., 25 Presumably,
such a result occurred because the judge exercised wide discretion in
granting damages for non-pecuniary loss just as he did in delictual
cases.6 Furthermore, "unchastity of the plaintiff' always constituted
a defense to the action, but even a showing of her general' bad
reputation "could constitute sufficient cause to deny recovery. 27
The underlying assumption made by this jurisprudence which
justified aggravating the measure of damages if the plaintiff was
seduced and denying her recovery if she was unchaste reflected the
historical "double standard"-a man desired to marry only a chaste
woman. There was no suggestion in the jurisprudence that the
unchastity of the groom was at all relevant. Thus, a woman who was
seduced by her fianc6 was no longer a desirable commodity in the
"marriage market," and by virtue ofthat lost value, she suffered longterm damage beyond what was usual for breach of the promise of
marriage. Using the same assumption, the man who broke his
engagement because he discovered that his fianc6 was unchaste had
been in error at the time of the contract and that error bore upon the
"principal" cause of the contract without which he would not have
promised to marry her. 8 Even if the bride did not know her chastity
was the principal cause of his promise to marry, the law nonetheless
presumed she knew.29
25. Supra note 15, at 504: "Proofof seduction will aggravate the damages ......
The author of the note cites Johnson v. Levy, 118 La. 446, 43 So. 46 (1907).
26. La. Civ. Code art. 1934(3) (1870):
In the assessment of damages under this rule [damages for non-pecuniary
loss in a breach of contract action], as well as in cases of offenses, quasi
offenses, and quasi contracts, much discretion must be left to the judge or
jury, while in other cases they have none, but are bound to give such
damages under the above rules as will fully indemnify the creditor,
whenever the contract has been broken by the fault, negligence, fraud or
bad faith of the debtor.
La. Civ. Code art. 2315 ("Every act whatever of man that causes damage to
another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."). Two other tort
actions historically recognized will be discussed later in the context of protecting
the marriage once formed. See text accompanying infra note 64.
27. Supranote 15, at 503. The author cites Morgan v. Yarborough, 5 La. Ann.
316(1850).
28. "The error in the cause of a contract to have the effect of invalidating it,
must be on the principal cause, when there are several; this principal cause is called
the motive, and means that consideration without which the contract would not have
been made." La. Civ. Code art. 1825 (1870).
29. "No error in the motive can invalidate a contract, unless the other party was
apprised that it was the principal cause ofthe agreement, or unless from the nature
of the transaction it must be presumed that he knew it." La. Civ. Code art. 1826
(1870) (emphasis added).
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The jurisprudence confidently applied contractual principles to
breach ofthe promise to marry and did so consistently with traditional
moral understanding. Marriage served the purpose of channeling
sexual expression between a man and a woman into a desirable
institution that could provide a stable environment for any resulting
children. The female was the guardian of societal moral standards,
no doubt for the very practical reason that she would bear the
consequence of any failure of self-control. The "double standard"
which distinguished between the acceptability of sexual experience
for a man and such experience for a woman was simply recognition
of her unique position as the bearer of offspring and her risk of graver
consequences should she fail to exercise sexual self-control. Such
jurisprudence seems at this juncture of history quite antiquated,
downright naive and Victorian. After all women have been liberated
from the consequences of lack ofsexual self-control; dependable and
effective birth control and the availability ofabortion have meant that
women are free to express themselves sexually in the same ways as
men. The cases recognizing the aggravating factor of"seduction" and
the legal defense of a female plaintiffs lack of chastity seem
decidedly unsophisticated. As John Witte, Jr. observes in From
Sacrament to Contract, "[s]exual pathos was prominent at the
opening of the second millennium with widespread concubinage
[cohabitation], prostitution, voyeurism, polygamy, adultery,
fornication, sodomy, wife and child abuse, teenage pregnancy,
abortion, and much else. Sexual pathos has returned with equal
pungency at theclose of this second millennium."30 Although there
continue to be actions instituted for breach of apromise ofmarriage,3 '
no one would expect reliance today upon this jurisprudence which
imposed sexual moral standards that do not treat men and women
equally.
2. Prerequisitesto a Valid Marriage: Who Can Marry and
How
Although the Louisiana Civil Code at the turn of the century
described marriage in the law as "a civil contract,"32 marriage was
never subject to the rules governing ordinary contracts.33 Marriage
30. Witte, supranote 2, at 217.
31. See Sanders v. Gore, 95-660 (La. App. 3d Cir. 7/10/96), 676 So. 2d 866
and Glass v. Wiltz, 551 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989), discussed in text at
infra notes 138-177.
32. "The law considers marriage in no other view than as a civil contract." La.
Civ. Code art. 86 (1870).
33. SeeHurryv. Hurry, 144 La. 877, 81 So. 378 (1919); Stallings v. Stallings,
177 La. 488, 148 So. 687 (1933); Mason v. Mason, 399 So. 2d 1272 (La. App. 4th
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historically was "more than a mere contract... -3 it was a relation, an
institution "in the maintenance ofwhich in its purity the public is deeply
interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society.
Referring to marriage as a "civil contract" can be explained by the fact
that "the prevailing philosophies of the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries considered all human institutions, even law itself, to have their
roots in contract .... -36 Furthermore, the use of the adjective "civil" to
modify contract was intended to announce that "Louisiana law...
controls all aspects of marriage,"' not ecclesiastical law.38
Because of the importance of marriage to potential posterity which
necessarily concerns the good ofsociety, the law has regulated entry into
marriage by proscribing who can not many, by providing under what
circumstances persons can marry, and by prescribing who must witness
the marriage and what documentary evidence ofthe marriage must exist.
To understand the significance ofany prerequisite to a valid marriage, it
is necessary to also consider the result of "contracting" a marriage
without the prerequisite. Some prerequisites were and still are
considered by the law and the jurisprudence as less serious than others,
and in those cases, the resulting marriage "contracted" by the spouses is
either valid despite failure of the couple to comply with the law or
merely relatively null and subject to their confirmation. Obviously, the
prerequisites which, though not followed by the couple, nonetheless do
not affect the validity of the resulting marriage are considered the least
serious. A failure to comply with a legal prerequisite to marriage that
creates a relatively null marriage subject to confirmation involves a rule

Cir. 1981). See alsoRhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288, 179 So. 2d 430 (1938); Zwikel
v. Zwikel, 154 La. 532, 97 So. 850 (1923); Cormier v. Cormier, 185 La. 968, 171
So. 93 (1936).
34. Hurry v. Hurry, 144 La. 877, 885, 81 So. 378, 381 (1919), quoting from
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211, 8 S. Ct. 723, 729 (1888).
35. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211, 8 S. Ct. 723, 729 (1888), quoted in
Hurry v. Hurry, 144 La. 877, 855, 81 So. 378, 381 (1919).
Even today in the comment to La. Civ. Code art. 86 (1987) the notion that
marriage is more than a contract is expressed: "The marriage contract differs from
other contracts in that it creates a social status that affects not only the contracting
parties, but also their posterity and the good order of society.. . ." Comment (c).
36. "The Philosophies of Locke and Ronsseau are examples." Spaht, supra
note 15, at 6.
37. Id.
38. La. Civ.Code art. 86 (1987): "Marriage is a legal relationship between a
man and a woman that is created by civil contract.... ." (emphasis added).
Comment (a) to this article reads: "... . In particular, the import ofArticle 86 of
the Civil Code of 1870 remains unchanged: the law views marriage as purely a civil
matter, and not as one subject to the operation of religious or ecclesiastical law.
The term 'civil' in former Article 86 has been retained in order to emphasize that
continuity of policy."
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"intended for the protection of private parties ....39 For the most
serious proscriptions, the resulting marriage is absolutely null not subject
to confirmation because such a marriage "violates a rule of public
order," not simply a rule for the protection of private persons.
Nonetheless, in the interest ofany children born of the union who would
otherwise be illegitimate," often "adulterous or incestuous bastards,"42
and in the interest ofan innocent spouse who had no knowledge of the
impediment, even an absolutely null marriage could produce 44civil
effects,4 3 an otherwise extraordinary result for an absolute nullity.
39. La. Civ. Code art. 2031 (1984). This provision of the law is found in Book
III, Title IV and refers to relatively null contracts; however, La. Civ. Code art. 1917
(1984) permits the application of the principles of Title IV (conventional
obligations) to "obligations that arise from sources other than contract to the extent
that those rules are compatible with the nature of those obligations." The
explanation for the category ofrelatively null marriages does assist in distinguishing
the prerequisites to a valid marriage and the consequences for any resulting
marriage "contracted" without the prerequisite.
40. La. Civ. Code art. 2030 (1984). "A contract is absolutely null when it
violates a rule of public order, as when the object of a contract is illicit or immoral.
A contract that is absolutely null may not be confirmed ......
41. Illegitimate children at the turn of the century until the late 1970s were
treated as outside the family. La. Civ. Code art. 238: "Illegitimate children
generally speaking, belong to no family, and have no relations; accordingly they are
not submitted to the paternal authority, even when they have been legally
acknowledged." This article remains unrepealed today.
As a consequence their rights to support and to inherit from their parents,
especially the father, were extremely limited. See La. Civ. Code arts. 240-245; 918
(intestate succession of the mother); and 919 (intestate succession of the father).
42. Children born of an adulterous or incestuous union were given the
appellation bastards. La. Civ. Code art. 202 (1870). They were treated especially
harshly as a way of punishing the conduct of the father and mother. See, e.g., La.
Civ. Code art. 920 (1870): "Bastards, adulterous or incestuous children shall not
enjoy the right of inheriting the estates of their natural father or mother, in any of
the cases above mentioned [intestate succession], the law allowing them nothing
more than a mere alimony." See also La. Civ. Code arts. 198 (prior to its
amendment in 1948); 245 (1870).
They could not be acknowledged by their parents. La. Civ. Code art. 204 (1870):
"Such acknowledgment shall not be made in favor of children whose parents were
incapable ofcontracting marriage at the time ofconception." One exception existed
by virtue of legislation in 1870 (1870 La. Acts, No. 68): children born of a
miscegenous union could be legitimated by a declaration signed by the parents
before a notary and two witnesses ifthe only impediment to the marriage was color.
Later in the middle 1940s, another exception was made for adulterous children
whose parents later married (assuming Article 161 did not apply for some reason).
The following language was added to La. Civ. Code art. 204 by 1948 La. Acts, No.
483: ". . . however, such acknowledgment may be made if the parents should
contract a legal marriage with each other."
43. La. Civ. Code art. 117 (1870): "The marriage, which has been declared
null, produces nevertheless its civil effects as it relates to the parties and their
children, if it has been contracted in good faith."
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At the turn of the century, the three prerequisites to a valid
marriage were parties who were willing to contract, able to contract,
and did
contract "pursuant to the forms and solemnities prescribed by
, 45
law.
3. PartiesNot Able to Contract: Absolute Nullity
Considered the most serious prerequisite to marriage, that the
parties be able to contract marriage, it is not surprising to discover
that the law at the turn of the century prohibited marrying a person
who is already legally married to another; 46 who is related in the
"direct ascending or descending line" 47 or in the collateral line
including first cousins;48 and who is a male under the age of eighteen
years or a female under the age of sixteen years.49 What did not
La. Civ. Code art. 118 (1870): "If only one of the parties acted in good faith, the
marriage produces its civil effects only in his or her favor, and in favor of the
children born of the marriage."
See such representative decisions interpreting these two provisions as Evans v.
Eureka Grand Lodge, 149 So. 305 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933); Howard v. Ingle, 180
So. 248 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938). For what constituted "good faith" see Succession
ofChavis, 211 La. 313, 29 So.2d 860 (La. 1947); Jones v. Squire, 137 La. 883, 69
So. 733 (La. 1915); Succession ofBussiere, 41 La. Ann. 217, 5 So. 668 (La. 1889).
See also Christoper L. Blakesley, The PutativeMarriageDoctrine,60 Tul. L. Rev.
1(1985).
44. In the ordinary case of an absolute nullity, for example an absolutely null
contract, the agreement produces no civil effects. See La. Civ. Code art. 2033
(1984): "An absolutely null contract...that has been declared null by the court, is
deemed never to have existed ......
45. La. Civ. Code art. 90 (1870).
46. La. Civ. Code art. 93 (1870): "Persons legally married are, until a
dissolution of marriage, incapable of contracting another, under the penalties
established by the laws of this State."
47. La. Civ. Code art. 94 (1870): "Marriage between persons related to each
other in the direct ascending or descending line is prohibited. This prohibition is
not confined to legitimate children, it extends also to children born out ofmarriage
48. La. Civ. Code art. 95 (1870): "Among collateral relations, marriage is
prohibited between brother and sister, whether of the whole or the half blood,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, between uncle and niece, between aunt and
nephew, and also between first cousins. ... " First cousins were permitted to marry
in Louisiana until 1902.
49. La. Civ. Code art. 92 (1870):
Ministers of the gospel and magistrates, intrusted with the power of
celebrating marriages, are prohibited to marry any male under the age of
eighteen years, and any female under the age ofsixteen, and ifany of them
are convicted of having married such persons, he shall be removed from
his office, if a magistrate, or deprived forever of the right of celebrating
marriage, if a minister of the gospel ....
The omitted second paragraph of this article permitted the judge to order such a
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appear at the turn ofthe century as an incapacity to contract marriage
was a person who is of the same sex. It never would have occurred
to the lawmaker to prohibit the marriage of persons of the same sex
since marriage, a natural institution by definition and by natural law,
could only be contracted by persons of the opposite sex.50 That
marriage could be contracted between persons ofthe same sex would
constitute an oxymoron; therefore, there was simply no need to
include any prohibition of such "marriage." No other civilization
which had recognized the institution of marriage had ever permitted
the marriage of persons of the same sex.5
As to the proscription of marriage between minors, the
jurisprudence distinguished its seriousness from that ofthe other two
incapacities by emphasizing that the article's language was addressed
to the minister or magistrate and not to the minors themselves."
Furthermore, another Civil Code article gave parents whose minor
children married without their consent the right to disinherit them
only, not the right to annul the marriage." Theriefore, the court
concluded that a marriage contracted between minors was not null,
either absolutely or relatively, but in fact valid. 4
marriage to take place in the case of "extraordinary circumstances" and parental
consent.
Distinguishing between the ages of males and females for the purpose of
consenting to marriage was consistent with recognition of different ages ofpuberty
for each. See La. Civ. Code art. 36 (1870) (age of puberty for males 14 and for
females, 12).
50. Essentially, the United States Supreme Court has taken the same position
in cases involving challenges to state marriage laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although recognizing that "marriage" is a fundamental right
surrounded by a zone of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution (liberty), marriage is defined traditionally as a union between a man
and a woman. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). See
also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.110, 127 n.6, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 2344 n.6
(1989).
51. See La. Civ. Code arts. 89, 96 and 3520(B) and text accompanying infra
notes 188-191.
52. Id.
53. La. Civ. Codeart. 112 (1870):
The marriage of minors, contracted without the consent of the father and
mother, can not for that cause be annulled, if it is otherwise contracted
with the formalities prescribed by law; but such want of consent shall be
a good cause for the father and mother to disinherit their children thus
married, if they think proper.
Article 112 was in fact addressed to an entirely different prerequisite to marriage:
parental consent for a minor with capacity to marry. La. Civ. Code art. 97 (1870):
"The minor of either sex, who has attained the competent age to marry, must have
received the consent of his father and mother or of the survivor of them; and if they
are both dead, the consent ofhis tutor...."
54. State v. Golden, 210 La. 347, 26 So. 2d 837 (1946).
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Not only were bigamous and incestuous marriages declared
absolutely null and incapable ofconfirmation in the public interest,5"
but also, what may prove surprising to a child of post-modem
America, so were marriages between white persons and "persons of
' between a man and a woman within ten months of the
color,"56
dissolution ofher marriage to another," and between an adulterer and
his accomplice in adultery.58 Until the 1967 United States Supreme
Court opinion in Loving v. Virginia,59 statutes prohibiting the
intermarriage of whites and people of color were common,
particularly in the South. Interestingly, however, the children born of
miscegenistic unions could be legitimated by their parents,' which
55. La. Civ. Code art. 113 (1870): "Every marriage contracted under the other
incapacities [not lack of free consent or lack of parental consent] or nullities
enumerated in the second chapter of this title, may be impeached either by the
married persons themselves, or by any person interested, orby the Attorney General
... ." Extending the right to challenge the marriage beyond the person or persons
to the marriage, especially to the Attorney General who represents the state, meant
that the marriage was absolutely null. See La. Civ. Code art. 2030 (1984): "....
Absolute nullity may be invoked by any person or may be declared by the court on
its own initiative."
56. La. Civ. Code art. 94 (1870; 1894): "... Marriage between white persons
and persons of color is prohibited, and the celebration of all such marriages is
forbidden and such celebration carries with it no effect and is null and void." The
prohibition of intermarriage between white persons and persons of color was
contained in the Civil Code or Digest of 1808, repealed in 1868 (1868 La. Acts, No.
210), and reenacted in 1894 (1894 La. Acts, No. 54). For representative cases
interpreting this article, see Ryan v. Barthelmy, 32 So.2d 467 (La. App. Onl. Cir.
1947); Lee v. N.O. & Great Northern Railroad Co., 125 La. 236, 51 So. 182 (La.
1910) (meaning of "persons of color" included as little as one sixteenth traceable
Negro blood); Sunseri v. Cassagne, 191 La. 209, 185 So. 1(La. 1938) (certificate
incorrect in describing person as colored); Villa v. Lacoste, 213 La. 654, 35 So. 2d
419 (1948) (persons of Filipino descent not "colored persons").
In Succession of Minvielle, 15 La. Ann. 342 (La. 1860): "The prohibition
contained in this article is one eminently affecting the public order... The law is
of that rigorous nature that it will not permit a marriage to exist between persons of
two different races for a moment.... ." See also Carter v. Veith, 139 La. 534, 71
So. 2d 792 (La. 1917).
White persons were also prohibited from marrying Indians. La. R.S. § 9:201
(repealed 1975).
57. La. Civ. Code art. 137 (1870): "The wife shall not be at liberty to contract
another marriage, until ten months after the dissolution of her preceding marriage."
58. La. Civ. Code art. 161 (1870): "In case ofdivorce, on account of adultery,
the guilty party can never hereafter contract matrimony with his or her accomplice
in adultery, under the penalty of being considered and prosecuted as guilty of the
crime ofbigamy, and under the penalty of nullity of the new marriage ...
59. 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967).
60. Despite the prohibition contained in La. Civ. Code art. 204 which denies
parents' the right to acknowledge their children if the parents were incapable of
contracting marriage at the time of conception (which includes adulterous and
incestuous children as well as those of miscegenistic unions), a special statute
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adulterous and incestuous children could not. The Loving case
declared Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Louisiana
finally repealed its statutes in the early 1970s. 6 1 The other two
prohibitions-remarriage of a wife within ten months of dissolution
of her marriage and marriage of an adulterer to his
accomplice-deserve more careful consideration of the underlying
rationale and of their ultimate repeal.
The prohibition of a wife's remarriage, requiring that she not
remarry for ten months after dissolution of her marriage, concerned
the application of the presumption of paternity of a child conceived
during the marriage. Under Civil Code article 184, the husband ofthe
mother was presumed to be the father ofall children conceived during
the marriage, which included a child born within three hundred days
(roughly equivalent to ten months) of the dissolution of the
marriage.62 Requiring a wife to wait ten months to remarry assured
that paternity of any child born to the wife could be easily established
using the presumptions of paternity contained in the Civil Code.
Were the wife to marry within the ten-month period, the issue of
"overlapping" presumptions of paternity would arise. 63 Under the
Civil Code, such a child would have been presumed to be the child of
both the first and the second husbands. Another secondary effect of
the prohibition was that a wife whose marriage ended could not rush
into remarriage. Current social science evidence reveals that second
marriages end at a much higher rate than first marriages, and first
marriages end at a rate of almost forty-five percent which is the
highest in the Western industrialized world. Thus, a law that had the
enacted in 1870 (1870 La. Acts No. 68) afforded to parents the right to legitimate
their children by a declaration signed by the parents before a notary and two
witnesses if the only impediment to the marriage of the parents at conception was
color. See Succession of Davis, 126 La. 178, 52 So. 266 (1910).
61. La. Civ. Code art. 94 (1870) was amended to repeal the prohibition of
marriage between white persons and persons of color by 1972 La. Acts No. 256, §
1. La.R.S. § 9:201 was repealed in 1975.
62. "The same rule [child not presumed to be that ofthe husband ofthe mother]
applies with respect to the child born three hundred days after the dissolution ofthe
marriage. . . ." La. Civ. Code art. 187 (1870).
63. The child born during the second marriage would be presumed to be the
child of the second husband as long as it was born more than one hundred and
eighty days after their marriage. "The child capable of living, which is born before
the one hundred and eightieth day after the marriage, is not presumed to be the child
of the husband. .. ." La. Civ. Code art. 186 (1870).
Nonetheless, even if the child were born within one hundred eighty days of the
marriage the husband had to institute a disavowal action to assert the lack of a
presumption and to prove the child was not his, otherwise the child was presumed
to be his child. La. Civ. Code art. 186 (as amended by 1976 La. Acts No. 430, §
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effect ofimposing a waiting period upon remarriage proved beneficial
for both certainty as to the child's paternity and the stability of a new
marriage contracted by the wife.
Prohibiting an adulterer from ever marrying his accomplice in
adultery contained in former Civil Code article 161 had a very
interesting and colorful history, one that demonstrates the significance
of withdrawal of the law from the regulation of sexual morality
within marriage.' Obviously intended to discourage adultery by
forever denying to the adulterer and his lover the possibility ofa valid
marriage after divorce,65 the law also denied the adulterer spouse who
was at fault, who could not get a divorce himself, 66 the possibility of
ultimately benefitting by his own fault. Furthermore, prohibiting the
adulterer from marrying his accomplice meant that the innocent
spouse had a real rather than illusory choice, either not to seek a
separation or a divorce or to seek an immediate divorce on the
grounds of adultery.68 She possessed a real choice because, even if
she sought and obtained a divorce her adulterous husband could not
thereafter marry his accomplice. 6 The innocent spouse was thus
afforded the full range of remedies available and given them
64. Two other actions, both in tort (delict) recognized by the law of other
jurisdictions were intended to serve a similar function: criminal conversation and
alienation ofaffections. See William R. Corbett, A SomewhatModestProposalto
PreventAdultery andSave Families:Two Old TortsLookingfor a New Career,33

Ariz. L.J. 987 (2001).
65. See Hubert, supranote 16.
66. Until 1916 and the enactment of "no-fault" divorce in the form of living
separate and apart for seven years (1916 La. Acts No. 269), the spouse at fault
could not file for an immediate divorce or for a separation from bed and board. The
only remedy available to the spouse at fault at the turn ofthe century was a divorce
two years after a judgment of separation from bed and board and the separation
action could only be instituted by the spouse not at fault. The guilty spouse had no
such remedy before 1898 (1898 La. Acts No. 25); only the innocent spouse could
seek a separation from bed and board and a divorce.
67. The only exception to the adulterer's benefitting by his own fault was the
possibility that if he married the accomplice he could thereafter assert that this
marriage was an absolute nullity. See Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288, 179 So. 430
(1938). Such a possibility is totally consistent with theory and legislation
concerning the character ofan absolute nullity. See La. Civ. Code art. 2033 (1984):
".... Absolute nullity may be raised as a defense even by a party who, at the time
the contract was made, knew or should have known of the defect that makes the
contract null."
68. The jurisprudence required that to assert the application ofLa. Civ. Code
art. 161 (1870) the divorce be instituted on the grounds of adultery. See e.g.,
Succession of Gabisso, 119 La. 704, 44 So. 438 (1907).

69. For the application of Article 161, the jurisprudence also required that the
accomplice be named in the proceedings. See Succession ofGabisso, 119 La. 704,
44 So. 438 (1907); Succession of Hernandez, 46 La. Ann. 962, 15 So. 461 (1894);
Succession of Knupfer, 174 La. 1048, 142 So. 609 (1932).
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exclusively; she could remain married to the adulterous spouse or
divorce him, in either case denying to the adulterous spouse the right
to marry his accomplice. If she chose to seek a divorce on the
grounds of adultery and obtained the judgment, the lawprovided that
she was the parent entitled to custody of the children.7"
Adultery has always been considered the most grievous of fault
grounds for divorce7 '-a personal betrayal of trust that strikes at the
core of the most intimate of relationships. It represents conduct that
by its nature violates one of the principal purposes of marriage from
society's point of view-that is, the channeling of sexual expression
between a man and a woman into an exclusive, monogamous
relationship. As previously mentioned, at the turn of the century,
children resulting from an adulterous or incestuous relationship were
treated under the law especially harshly; they were denied rights
afforded to other illegitimate children7 2 and denoted in the Civil Code
as "bastards. 73 Their parents could not marry after one or both were
divorced, and even if they could have married because Article 161 did
not apply,74 their marriage did not legitimate the child until after the
Civil Code article concerning legitimation by subsequent marriage
was amended in 1948.7s
La. Civ. Code art. 157 (1870):
In all cases of separation, the children shall be placed under the care of
the party who shall have obtained the separation, unless the judge shall, for
the greater advantage of the children, and with the advice of the family
meeting, order that some or all ofthem shall be intrusted to the care ofthe
other party.
In all cases of divorce the minor children shall be placed under the
tutorship of that party who shall have obtained the divorce.
71. Adultery constituted both grounds for obtaining a judgment of separation
from bed and board (La. Civ. Code art. 138(1) (1870)) and for obtaining ajudgment
of divorce (La. Civ. Code art. 139(1) (1870)). It remains only one of two fault
grounds for obtaining an immediate divorce. La. Civ. Code art. 103(2) (1990). It
is even grounds for an immediate divorce (and ajudicial separation) in a covenant
marriage. La. R.S. § 9:307(A), (B) (1997).
72. See text accompanying supra note 60.
73. La. Civ. Code art. 202 (1870):
Illegitimate children who have been acknowledged by their father, are
called natural children; those who have not been acknowledged by their
father, or those whose father and mother were incapable of contracting
marriage at the time of conception, or whose father is unknown, are
contradistinguished by the appellation of bastards.
74. For example, Louisiana Civil Code article 161 might not apply to prohibit
the marriage of an adulterer and his accomplice because the accomplice was not
named in the proceedings.
75. La. Civ. Code art. 198 (1870):
Children born out of marriage, except those who are born from an
incestuous or adulterous connection, may be legitimated bythe subsequent
marriage of their father and mother, whenever the latter have legally
70.
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Civil Code article 161 went even further than prohibiting the
marriage of an adulterer and his accomplice; it imposed upon the
adulterer the penalty "ofbeing considered and prosecuted as guilty of
the crime of bigamy. . .. " The article's imposition of criminal
liability for bigamy explains the use of "accomplice in adultery" in
the Civil Code article. Compared to the other prohibitions related to
the capacity of a person to marry, this article imposed the harshest
consequences. Of course, in the case of a person who married before
his prior marriage was dissolved and of persons related within
prohibited degrees ofrelationship, the criminal law also punished the
behavior-the former as bigamy" and the latter as incest.7" The
legislature intended to treat the marriage of an adulterer and his
accomplice as harshly as a bigamous or incestuous
marriage-absolutely null and criminal. Apparently, the legislature
considered the circumstances of a marriage conceived in adultery as
the equivalent in seriousness and in potential threat to the public order
and good morals as a bigamous or incestuous marriage. Bigamy,
polygamy,79 and incest were abhorrent, hence their punishment
historically in both the civil and criminal laws of this country.
However, in 1958 the Louisiana Legislature began to ratify and
declare valid the marriages of an adulterer and his accomplice,
utilizing the following statutory language: ". . provided, however,
that marriages heretofore contracted in contravention of this article
but which are not invalid under any other laws of this state shall be
deemed valid."8 ° 'Inactuality, amendments to the articles ofthe Civil
Code concerning illegitimate children in the middle 1940s recognized
that adulterous bastards could be legitimated by subsequent marriage,
which implicitly recognized that an adulterer and his accomplice
might be able to contract a legal marriage.8 ' After 1958, a pattern of
acknowledged them for their children, either before their marriage by an
act passed before a notary and two witnesses, or by their contract of
marriage itself.
In the 1940s the article was amended to remove references to adulterous connection
and to add the additional possibility of informally acknowledging the child. See
1944 La. Acts No. 50 and 1948 La. Acts No. 482.
76. "In case of divorce, on account of adultery, the guilty party can never
hereafter contract matrimony with his or her accomplice in adultery, under the
penalty of being considered and prosecuted as guilty of the crime of bigamy.... "
La. Civ. Code art. 161 (1870). See also La. R.S. § 14:76 (1898 La. Acts No. 93,

§ 1).

77. 1898 La. Acts No. 93, at 116.
78. 1884 La. Acts No. 78, at 101.
79. See,for example, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145 (1878).
80. 1958 La. Acts No. 340, § 1.
81. La. Civ. Code art. 198 (1870, as amended by 1944 La. Acts No. 50; 1948
La. Acts No. 482) (legitimation by subsequent marriage of the parents of an
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periodic ratification ofsuch marriages developed.8 2 Thus, "heretofore
contracted" meant that such marriages contracted within the two-year
period preceding the particular legislative session were declared valid.
Finally, the legislature repealed the article in 1972.3 Almost
simultaneously the legislature adopted the same pattern ofratification
every two years to cure "incestuous" marriages contracted between
collaterals,"4 a general practice that only ended in 1987.5
A common phenomenon which was to be repeated numerous
times after the middle 1940s served as the motivation for the
legislature and the courts to change public policy: sympathy for the
innocent child born of an adulterous union. 6 Policymakers and
courts had sympathy for the child who was often punished, too, and
who had no control over the conduct of his parents.8 7 Ten years after
illegitimate child and his formal or informal acknowledgment). La. Civ. Code art.
204 (1870 as amended by 1948 La. Acts No. 483): "Such acknowledgment [ofan
illegitimate child] shall not be made in favor of children whose parents were
incapable of contracting marriage at the time of conception; however, such
acknowledgment may be made if the parents should contract a legal marriage with
each other." (emphasis added).
82. 1962La. ActsNo. 271,§ 1; 1966La.ActsNo. 182, §1; 1968La. ActsNo.
591, § 1; 1970 La. Acts No. 739, § 1.
83. 1972 La. Acts No. 625, § 1.
84. La. Civ. Code art. 95 (prior to its amendment in 1987). "... Marriages
contracted by these collaterals [within the fourth degree] before September 11,
1981, were legal under former Civil Code Article 95, as retroactively amended by
La. Acts 1981 No. 647. Though not continued as part of the Civil Code, that
validating provision has been carried forward in Section 5 of the act embodying the
revision (La. Acts 1987 No. 886)." La. Civ. Code art. 90, comment (b).
In addition La. Civ. Code art. 113 (1870; 1950) validated "marriages heretofore
contracted between persons related within the prohibited degrees, either or both of
whom were then and afterwards domiciled in this State, and were prohibited from
intermarrying therein.., where such marriages were celebrated in other States or
countries under the laws of which they are not prohibited...."
85. One small exception remains. La. R.S. § 9:211 (1993): "Notwithstanding
the provisions of Civil Code article 90, marriages between collaterals within the
fourth degree, fifty-five years ofage or older, which were entered into on or before
December 31, 1992, shall be considered legal and the enactment hereof shall in no
way impair vested property rights." This legislation is an illustrative example of
special legislation designed for two constituents.
86. This sympathy was expressed in United States Supreme Court opinions
such as Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459 (1977); Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400 (1972); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535, 93 S.Ct. 872 (1973); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct. 1509 (1968).
See also La. Const. art. I § 3 (1974) (no discrimination on account of birth);
Succession of Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980). Also, the phenomenon of
judicial recognition of "dual paternity" is justified by notions of protecting the
child. See Griffin v. Succession of Branch, 479 So. 2d 324 (La. 1985) and Smith
v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989).
87. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Two "ICS" of the 2001 LouisianaChild
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the 1948 amendment which permitted the legitimation of adulterous
"bastards," the first bill ratifying marriages between an adulterer and
his accomplice passed, a circumstance which was repeated almost
every two years thereafter. Inevitably the pattern ofratification led to
the repeal of the prohibition.8 The withdrawal of public
condemnation ofthe children conceived in adultery and ultimately of
the adulterer himself left only the obligation of each spouse to be
faithful to the other8 9 for which the law permitted the offended spouse
the right to seek a divorce. 90 However, by contrast to the law
historically, the right to seek a divorce did not belong exclusively to
the offended spouse.9 ' Even though the public continues to impose
a legal obligation of fidelity upon the spouses in their personal
relationship and permits an immediate divorce for the betrayed
spouse, it has in every other respect withdrawn any punishment on
behalf ofsociety at large for conduct once considered violative ofthe
public interest, punishment intended to protect the marital
relationship from destructive outside forces.9'
4. A MarriageCeremony: Absolute Nullity
For the reason that marriage bestows upon the spouses special
legal privileges, rights and obligations, the law has always required
a certain formality" to mark the change in relationship between a man
and a woman, converting an informal relationship to that of a formal
legal relationship. The ceremony performed by a legally qualified
third person94 who witnessed the exchange of vows, composed of
Support Guidelines: Economics andPolitics,62 La. L. Rev. 709, 732-35 (2002).
88. Interestingly enough, repeal ofthe prohibition against marrying a collateral
relation did not occur despite a similar pattern. See discussion in text at supranotes
84-85.
89. La. Civ. Code art. 119 (1870): "The husband and wife owe to each other
mutually, fidelity, support and assistance." (emphasis added). See La. Civ. Code
art. 98 (1987).
90. La. Civ. Code arts. 138(1) (separation from bed and board), 139(1)
(divorce) (1870). See La. Civ. Code art. 103(2) (1990).
91. See supranotes 64-70.
92. See also William R. Corbett, supra note 64 (discussing two torts
historically recognized which had the same purpose: criminal conversation and
alienation of affection).
93. La. Civ. Code art. 90 (1870):
As the law considers marriage in no other view than that of a civil
contract, it sanctions all those marriages where the parties, at the time of
making them...
(3) Did contract pursuant to the forms and solemnities prescribed by law.
94. Ministers of the gospel, a priest of any religious sect, parish judges and
justices of the peace were at the turn of the century recognized as authorized to
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consent by both husband and wife, served the purpose of that
formality. The law also required the presence ofthree witnesses and
the execution of the act of celebration of the marriage,95 but these
"formalities" were considered merely directory under the
jurisprudence, which meant that they did not affect the validity ofthe
marriage.96 Only the ceremony presided over by a celebrant was
considered essential.97
Although the legislation suggested that the absence ofa ceremony
did not result in an absolutely null marriage as was the case for
incapacities,98 the jurisprudence characterized a marriage without a
ceremony as an absolute nullity.99 Obviously, as with incapacities,
the public has an interest in assuring that those persons claiming
special benefits and privileges afforded by law by virtue of their
status as married are indeed entitled to them. These legal benefits
often adversely affect third parties or the rest of society-for
example, community or marital property was subject to seizure only
by creditors of the husband" ° and tax privileges and social welfare
benefits were supported by public tax dollars. A ceremony with an
perform marriage ceremonies as long as the clergymen registered. La. Civ. Code
arts. 102, 103 (1870, 1958).
95. La. Civ. Code art. 105 (1870): "The marriage must be celebrated in the
presence of three witnesses of full age, and an act must be made of the celebration,
signed by the person who celebrates the marriage, by the parties and the witnesses."
96. See, e.g., Succession of Jene, 173 So. 2d 857 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965);
Landry v. Bellanger, 120 La. 962, 45 So. 956 (1908); Sabalot v. Populus, 31 La.
Ann. 854 (1879).
97. Sesostris Youchican v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 147 La. 1080, 86 So. 551
(1920).
98. La. Civ. Code art. 113 (1870) declared that all marriages.contracted under
incapacities or nullities "enumerated in the second chapter of this title" may be
impeached bypersons other than the parties themselves, and the second chapter did
not include any of the articles prescribing the formalities for marriage (they were
all in the third chapter). Nonetheless, the courts concluded that the ceremony
constituted the "contracting" and was a necessary prerequisite to the marriage itself
even if"contracted" by persons who were incapable. See discussion in such cases
as Succession ofMarinoni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935) (considered a marriage
without a ceremony an absolutely null marriage and as such a potentially putative
marriage) and Succession of Rossi, 214 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
refused, 216 So. 2d 309 (La. 1968).
99. La. Civ. Code art. 113 (1870).
100. The community of acquets and gains was and is the legal regime for
married spouses in Louisiana (La. Civ. Code art. 2327) and absent a matrimonial
agreement adopting a different regime, as presently permitted under La. Civ. Code
art. 2328, the spouses are to be governed by the law regulating the community
regime. At the turn of the century the husband was the head and master of the
community of acquets and gains (La. Civ. Code art. 2404 (1870)). By contrast,
today the creditors of either spouse may seize community property in its entirety,
not simply the one-half interest of the debtor spouse (La. Civ. Code arts. 2336 and
2345).
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authorized third party present as a witness afforded proof of the
marriage and assured that indeed the parties were entitled to the rights
and privileges of married persons without relying solely upon the
simple, potentially self-serving, testimony of the parties.
5.Free Consent ofthe Parties: Relative Nullity
As is true for an ordinary contract,' ' Louisiana law has always
required that the parties consent to marriage freely.'0 2 If either spouse
to a marriage failed to consent freely, then the resulting marriage was
a relative nullity, 1 3 subject to confirmation by cohabitation between
the party who did not freely consent and the other spouse.' 4 A
marriage in which one party did not freely consent produced a
relative, rather than an absolute, nullity because the law requiring
consent is designed for the protection of private parties rather than
protection of the public order.0 5 The defect of lack of free consent
was and is considered to be less serious than those defects that created
incapacity to contract marriage.
General contract law provided essentially the same result,
classifying the contract to which at least one person did not fully
consent as "voidable."' 06 Of course, there was a difference between
101. La. Civ. Code art. 1797 (1870): "When the parties have the legal capacity
to form a contract, the next requisite to its validity is their consent. .."
La. Civ. Code art. 1798 (1870): "As there must be two parties at least to every
contract, so there must be something proposed by one and accepted and agreed to
by another to form the matter of such contract; the will ofboth parties must unite
on the same point."
See also La. Civ. Code art. 1927 (1984).
102. La. Civ. Code art. 90 (1870): "As the law considers marriage in no other
view than that ofa civil contract, it sanctions all those marriages where the parties,
at the time ofmaking them, were: (1) Willing to contract ....
" See also La. Civ.
Code art. 87 (1987).
103. La. Civ. Code art. 110 (1870):
Marriages celebrated without the free consent of the married persons,
or one ofthem, can only be annulled upon application ofboth the parties,
or that one of them whose consent was not free.
When there has been a mistake in the person, the party laboring under
the mistake can alone impeach the marriage.
104. La. Civ. Code art. 111 (1870): "In the cases embraced by the preceding
article, the application to obtain a sentence annulling the marriage, is inadmissible,
if the married persons have, freely and without constraint, cohabited together after
recovering their liberty or discovering the mistake."
"Louisiana jurisprudence has generally defined the term 'cohabitation' as
necessarily including sexual intercourse." Ford v. Ford, 292 So. 2d 275 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1974); State v. Brown, 236 La. 562, 108 So. 2d 233 (1959); State v. Freddy,
117 La. 121, 41 So. 436 (1906) .... La. Civ. Code art. 95, comment (c)).
105. La. Civ. Code art. 2031 (1984).
106. La. Civ. Code art. 1881 (1870): "Engagements made through error,
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a contract that was "relatively null" and one that was "voidable." A
relatively null contract was and is null until confirmation, and a
voidable contract is valid until declared null. Thejurisprudence at the
turn of the century considered a marriage contracted without the free
consent of one or both parties as valid until declared null,"0 7 a result
no doubt motivated by a desire to protect the innocent off-spring of
such a marriage from illegitimacy which was not a concern ofgeneral
contract law. Present law codifies this jurisprudence"°8 which is a
clear legislative departure from the result in the case of an ordinary
contract to which one or both of the parties did not freely consent.
An ordinary contract lacking the free consent of one of the parties is
null until
confirmed by the party whose consent was not freely
given.' °9
Law at the turn of the century was not prosaic in its description of
those instances where consent to a marriage was not freely given; for
example, consider "[w]hen given to a ravisher, unless it has been
given by the party ravished, after she has been restored to the
enjoyment of liberty.... 110 The other two examples mentioned in the
article were consent given because of violence, which would include
that given to a ravisher presumably, or because of a mistake
respecting the person."' Early jurisprudence interpreted "mistake
respecting the person" to mean only a mistake in physical identity," 2
not to mistakes concerning some quality or qualities of personality
that one party believed the other to possess-like chastity'13 or
sanity." 4 Not surprisingly, there was no Louisiana case declaring a
marriage null for lack of consent due to a mistake respecting the
violence, fraud or menace, are not absolutely null, but are voidable by the parties,
who have contracted under the influence of such error, fraud, violence or menace,
or by the representatives of such parties."
107. See, for example, State v. Loyacano, 66 So. 307 (La. 1914); Lacoste v.
Guidry, 47 La. Ann. 295, 16 So. 836 (1895). See also Succession ofBarth, 178 La.
847, 152 So. 543 (1934) andDelpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann. 923, 25 So. 547 (1899).
108. La. Civ. Code art. 97 (1987).
109. La. Civ. Code art. 2033 (1984). A relatively null contract is null until
confirmed by the party or parties. La. Civ. Code arts. 2031, 1842 (1984).
110. La. Civ. Code art. 91(1) (1870).
111. La. Civ. Code art. 91:
Consent is not free:

112.
113.
114.
Heirs,
(1879).

(2) When it is extorted by violence
(3) When there is a mistake respecting the person, whom one of
the parties intended to marry.
Delpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann. 923, 25 So. 547 (1899).
Id.
Stier v. Price, 214 La. 394, 37 So. 2d 847 (1948); Ducasse v. Ducasse's
120 La. 731, 45 So. 565 (1908); Sabalot v. Populous, 31 La. Ann. 854
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person." ' The Louisiana Supreme Court eloquently expressed the
justification
for so narrowly interpreting the phrase in Delpit v.
16
Young:"
... ifthe general assembly had intended that marriages should
be annulled when the one party mistakes the character, the
social standing, the pedigree, the acquirements, the pecuniary
means, the habits, the temperament, or the religion of the
other, or when the one party, after the marriage, discovers
"redhibitory" vices in the other, some language beyond the
words "mistake respecting the person," would have been
found to express that intention. If the marriage of a woman
is to be annulled because she was unchaste before marriage,
what is to be done in the case of a man?"' Ifthe courts are to
determine whether the mistake is sufficiently serious, how are
they to deal with people who, having united themselves
together "for better, for worse, in sickness and in health," etc.,
present a case where the one develops hereditary disease, such
as consumption, or insanity, of the possibility of which the
other was ignorant, or becomes confirmed in a pre-existing
alcohol or opium habit, ofwhich the other had no knowledge?
Consent extorted by violence or by a ravisher essentially concerned
violence or threats of violence, which today is expressed simply by
use of the word duress. 18 Judges applied to "contracting" marriage
the same principles that made violence or threats of violence a lack
of free consent in ordinary contracts; principles highly developed in
the legislation and jurisprudence." 9
By virtue of the structure of Article 91, which listed three
instances in which consent was not free, the jurisprudence was
ultimately required to determine if the list was illustrative or
115. For a full discussion ofthis subject, see Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revision
of the Law ofMarriage: One Baby Step Forward,48 La. L. Rev. 1131 (1988).
116. 51 La. Ann. 923, 931, 25 So. 547, 550 (1899).
117. Interestingly, this is an issue about which the court had no difficulty if a
female plaintiff was seeking damages for breach of a promise to marry and the
defendant proved the lack of chastity of the plaintiff. Lack of chastity of a female
plaintiff was a recognized defense. See discussion of this topic in text at supra
notes 27-30.
118. See La. Civ. Code arts. 93, 1959-1963 (1984).
119. La. Civ. Code arts. 1850-1859 (1870). Representative cases include
Grundmeyer v. Sander, 143 So. 45 (La. 1932); Thompson v. Thompson, 87 So. 250
(La. 1921); Simmons v. Simmons, 61 So. 734 (La. 1913); Pray v. Pray, 55 So. 666
(La. 1911); Quealyv. Waldron, 52 So. 479 (La. 1910); Collins v. Ryan, 22 So. 920
(La. 1897); Lacoste v. Guidroz, 47 La. Ann. 295, 16 So. 836 (La. 1895); Seals v.
Jacob, 292 So. 2d 885 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Taylor v. Castille, 318 So. 2d 106
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Stakelum v. Teral, 126 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1961).
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exclusive. Was a marriage contracted by an insane person valid? If
not, was it an example of an instance where the insane person's
consent was not freely given? Such a marriage was not one in which
the law of marriage considered that the insane person lacked ability
to contract. A mid-twentieth century case in dicta considered the
marriage of an insane person subject to annulment but only by the
insane person or his legal representative,120 thus implicitly deciding
that the insane person's consent was not freely given since a limited
right to annul applies only to a relative nullity. Therefore, one could
argue that the jurisprudence interpreted the list of instances when a
party's consent to marriage is not free as illustrative, rather than
exclusive. Nonetheless, no Louisiana case ever explicitly held the
article illustrative, leaving open to question such marriages as those
contracted by a party under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Examining the jurisprudence interpreting the instances oflack of
free consent to a marriage, one can reach the conclusion that
annulment of a marriage for failing to freely consent was not easy to
obtain, despite the dicta in one case suggesting that the restrictive list
in Article 91 was illustrative. The attitude of judges toward
annulment for lack of free consent at the turn ofthe century can best
be described as extremely cautious. Such a cautious approach was
justified since cases involving lack of free consent to marriage
concern laws for the protection of private parties' 2 1 not matters of
public order,22 and there are serious consequences for the parties and
their offspring. In addition, the judiciary recognized the potential for
abuse of actions to annul marriage at a time when divorce was
difficult to obtain and the interest of society in maintaining the
stability of marriages, the foundation of the family unit, was widely
accepted. Judges such as the author of the oft-quoted language in
Delpitv. Young,123 expressed the notion that each spouse should take
his marriage vows seriously, for the court surely would.
6. OtherStatutoryRequirements: Valid Marriage
Other legal prerequisites to marriage - such as the requirement of
a marriage license' issued only after obtaining copies of the parties'
120. Stier v. Price, 214 La. 394, 37 So. 2d 847 (1948).
121. La. Civ. Code art. 2031 (1984).
122. See language in text accompanying supranote 105.
123. See supranote 116.
124. La. Civ. Code art. 104 (1870):
No minister of the gospel, or other person, shall celebrate any marriage in this
State, unless he shall have obtained previously a special license to him directed,
issued by the person appointed by law to grant licenses inthe parish wherein the
marriage is to be celebrated, authorizing him to celebrate such marriage.
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birth certificates; 2 5 the results of blood tests to screen for venereal
disease'26 and later AIDS;' 27 the affidavit that the parties were not
related within the prohibited degrees; 2 8 the consent of parents, 29 if
necessary; the lapse of seventy-two hours between issuance of the
license and performance of the ceremony; 30 a duly qualified and
registered celebrant;131 three witnesses to the ceremony;3 32 and an act
of marriage executed at the ceremony and signed by the parties, the
celebrant and the witnesses 131were considered by the jurisprudence
as merely directory.134 Therefore, the failure to comply with any such
"formalities" did not affect the validity of the parties' marriage.
Almost all of the provisions containing these formalities were
addressed to the officiant rather than to the parties or to the marriage,
and no other Civil Code article declared null a marriage without such
prerequisites. Although the proscription of the marriage of minors
of a certain age was located in a different chapter from other
"formalities" and there was a specific article in the Civil Code that
provided for its invalidity, 3 1the courts concluded that marriages of
minors were valid, rather than null, because the language ofthe article
was addressed to the celebrant rather than the parties. 31
All of these prerequisites in the nature of formalities were
designed to provide evidence of a marriage and to elicit information
from the prospective spouses that would be useful to the two parties
as well as to the officiant or other state officer. Because marriage
conferred, and still does confer, extensive legal rights and obligations,
requiring a marriage license and an act of marriage with witnesses
and a celebrant assured that there would be evidence of the marriage,
37
either in the form of a document or the testimony of witnesses.
See also La. Civ. Code arts. 99 (1870; as amended 1882 La. Acts No. 25; 1948 La.
Acts No. 312).
125. La. R.S. § 9:241 (repealed 1987).
126. La. R.S. §§ 9:229-233 (repealed 1988).
127. Id.
128. La. Civ. Code art. 95 (1870; as amended by 1902 La. Acts No. 9).
129. La. Civ. Code arts. 97, 98 (1870).
130. La. Civ. Code art. 99 (1870; as amended by 1882 La. Acts No. 25; 1948
La. Acts No. 312).
131. La. Civ. Code arts. 102 (1870; as amended by 1952 La. Acts No. 229; 1958
La. Acts No. 331).
132. La. Civ. Code art. 105 (1870).
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Succession of Jene, 173 So. 2d 857 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965);
Landry v. Bellanger, 120 La. 962, 45 So. 956 (1908); and Sabalot v. Populus, 31

La. Ann. 854 (1879).
135. La. Civ. Code art. 113 (1870; as amendedby 1938 La. ActsNo. 426; 1950
La. Acts No. 242).
136. See discussion in text accompanying supranotes 52-54.
137. In the absence of the best evidence, which includes the documentary
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Some of the other requirements were intended to elicit information
from the two parties, which in the case of the blood tests to screen for
sexually transmitted diseases, were intended as much for the two
parties as for the state officer. Other information to be submitted to
the clerk, such as that contained in the affidavit that the parties were
not related within the prohibited degrees and in the expression of
parental consent, concerned protection of the public's interest. The
seventy-two hour waiting period was designed to protect the parties
from the hastiness of a decision to marry. Howeverjustified and well
intended the purposes of the formalities, when weighed against the
public's interest in the stability of marriages, especially for the
protection ofthe offspring ofthe parties, the jurisprudence concluded
that none ofthese formalities rose to a level ofseriousness that should
affect the validity ofa marriage. In fact, there was never a suggestion
that there was widespread noncompliance with the legally required
formalities.
B. PresentLaw on Entry Into Marriage
1. PromiseofMarriage
Despite the fact that other states have long since abandoned an
action for breach of the promise to marry, 3 ' Louisiana has not. Even
though the Civil Code no longer specifically refers to the promise to
marry as an example of a contract for the breach of which the law
permits the recovery of non-pecuniary damages, 139 the comments
evidence ofthe marriage act, a marriage license, or the testimony of the celebrant
or witnesses, the law creates a presumption that a couple is married if they hold
themselves out as a married couple within the community. Under the jurisprudence,
the only exception to the presumption is if the relationship of the couple began in
concubinage (cohabitation). Succession of Dotson, 202 La. 77, 11 So. 2d 488
(1942); Succession of Tyson, 186 La. 516, 172 So. 772 (1937); Oliphant v. La.
Long Leaf Lbr. Co., 163 La. 601, 112 So. 500 (1927); Doiron v. Vacuum Oil Co.,
164 La. 15, 113 So. 748 (1927); Succession of Fuselier, 325 So. 2d 296 (La. App.
3rd Cir. 1975) (court confused presumption of marriage with the putative marriage
doctrine).
138. Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises,6 J.L. Ec. Org. 203 (1990).
Rings and Promises discusses the death of a legal rule, the suit for breach
of promise to marry, not only in terms of the changing social forces
involving courtship that hastened its demise but in terms ofthe custom that
arose to replace the legal action [diamond engagement ring as contract
guarantee].
Margaret F. Brinig, Carl E. Schneider & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Going Courting,in
Family Law in Action: A Reader 69 (1999).
139. La. Civ. Code art. 1998 (1984):
Damages for nonpencuniary loss may be recovered when the contract,
because of its nature is intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest and,
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reveal there was no intent to change the law. Furthermore, Article
1740 which directs that donations in contemplation of marriage fall
if the marriage does not take place remains."
Two relatively recent appellate court cases have had the occasion
to consider an action for breach of the promise to marry: one in
which the breach is raised as a reconventional demand to an action to
recover an engagement ring worth in excess of $25,000, 41' and the
second in which the defendant raised the defense that the promise to
marry was null because ofan illicit cause, an existing marriage.' 42 In
Glass v. Wiltz, 14 3 the groom who broke the engagement sought to
recover the engagement ring from the defendant who had refused to
return it. Under Civil Code article 1740, the plaintiff was entitled to
recover the ring, but the defendant filed a reconventional demand
against the groom alleging his breach ofthe promise to marry and her
consequential damages. Relying upon an earlier 1960s case,' 44 the
court enunciated the rule of law as follows: "The trend therefore
seems to be that courts resist awarding damages in such causes of
action unless the injured party can clearly demonstrate that he or she
is free from fault and that he or she has suffered damage." 145
Ultimately, the court concluded that the defendant, plaintiff in
reconvention, failed to prove that she suffered damage or that any
physical damage she suffered was caused by his breach ofthe promise
to marry, both ofwhich46are required to recover any type of damages
for breach of contract. 1
More intriguing than the holding of the court in the Glass case
was the articulation of the "trend" in the law, which apparently
continues to recognize that the plaintiff claiming breach of promise
to marry may be denied recovery unless he or she is free offault. The
word fault did have a statutory definition at the time of the Glass
case; but the differentiation ofits various degrees, i.e., gross, slight or
very slight, applied almost exclusively within the context of quasi-

because of the circumstances surrounding the formation or the
nonperformance of the contract, the obligor knew, or should have known,
that his failure to perform would cause that kind of loss...
Comment (c) gives as an example a "contract involving matters of sentimental
value."
140. See discussion in text at supranotes 23-24 about the nature of this action
as one based upon failure ofcause.
141. Glass v. Wiltz, 551 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
142. Sanders v. Gore, 95-660 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1996), 676 So. 2d 866.
143. 551 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
144. Daigle v. Fournet, 141 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
145. Glass, 551 So. 2d at 33 (emphasis added).
146. La. Civ. Code art. 1994 (1984): "An obligor is liable for the damages
caused by his failure to perform a conventional obligation...."
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offenses. 4 7 The definition was repealed in 1999.14 The term free of
fault appears to be more analogous to free from fault found in Civil
Code article 111, which conditions final periodic support [permanent
alimony], upon a party proving she is "free from fault prior to the filing
ofa proceeding to terminate the marriage .....

49

Fault in Article 111,

however, has ajurisprudential definition: grounds for separation from
bed and board that existed prior to 1990,5 ° such as adultery, attempt on
the life of a spouse, cruel treatment or habitual intemperance."'
Because this conduct constituting fault for purposes ofspousal support
after divorce involves breach of the explicit and implicit obligations
imposed upon spouses," it is difficult to envision the court applying
this definition offault in the context of a breach of the promise to
marry. Therefore, a judge is apparently free to define the term in the
context of a defense to an action for breach of the promise to marry as
he sees fit. It is hard to imagine that fault at this moment in the twentyfirst century could mean lack of chastity of the claimant,' be the
claimant male or female, much less a generally bad reputation."s
However, by considering fault ofthe claimant relevant to the action for
breach of promise to marry, the court in Glass suggests that some
defendants who break their engagement are justified, although it is not
clear what behavior ofthe plaintiff constitutes such justification.
147.

La. Civ. Code art. 3506(13):
... The gross fault is that which proceeds from inexcusable negligence
or ignorance; it is considered as nearly equal to fraud.
The slight fault is that want ofcare which a prudent man usually takes
of his business.
The very slight fault is that which is excusable, and for which no
responsibility is incurred.
148. 1999 La. Acts No. 503, § 1, amending La. Civ. Code art. 3506 to remove
the definition of fault.
149. La. Civ. Code art. 111 (1997).
150. La. Civ. Code art. 101, cormnent(c) (1990): "The source Article's
reference to the effect ofseparation from bed and board has been omitted because
this revision does not provide for legal separation."
Separation from bed and board does exist for couples in a covenant marriage.
See La. R.S. § 9:307(B) (1997).
151. Adams v. Adams, 389 So. 2d 381 (La. 1980); Goodnight v. Goodnight, 735
So. 2d 809 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1999); Currier v. Currier, 599 So.2d 456 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1992).
Additional fault grounds for separation from bed and board contained in La. Civ.
Code art. 138 (1870) include: conviction of a felony and sentence of imprisonment
at hard labor or death, public defamation, being charged with a felony and fleeing
from justice, abandonment, and intentional non-support of a spouse who is in
destitute or necessitous circumstances.
152. La. Civ. Code art. 98 (1987).
153. See text accompanying supranote 27 for a discussion ofthis defense which
was available at the turn of the century.
154. Id.
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Sanders v. Gore'55 may be even more important for purposes of
measuring the effect of the withdrawal ofthe law from the regulation
ofmarriage. The prospective bride filed suit against the prospective
groom alleging breach of a promise to marry and claiming both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, as well as the return of gifts
to him made by her. The defendant by means of an exception raised
the defense that the contract (the promise ofmarriage) was absolutely
null because it was against public policy and as such no damages
were due for its breach. 56 The essence of the defendant's promise
according to the court was "not merely that he would marry Ms.
Sanders, but that he would divorce his wife and marry Ms.
At the time the defendant promised to marry the
Sanders."'
plaintiff, he was married to someone else; the plaintiff on the other
hand was persuaded by the defendant to divorce her husband.
Relying upon research and the opinion ofscholars that the action for
breach of the promise to marry was borrowed from the common
law, 5 ' the court examined common law authorities which supported
the proposition that "promises of marriage, when made by persons
Of course, the civil law
already married, are unenforceable."'
likewise recognizes that contracts in derogation of marriage are
against public policy, according to the court. The arguments raised
by the plaintiff that public policy no longer supports protection of the
marital relationship and the discussion by the court of those
arguments in its majority and dissenting opinions prove to be the
most interesting parts of the opinion.
The plaintiff argued that the refusal to enforce contracts that
derogated from marriage was no longer the public policy ofLouisiana
as demonstrated by the state's lack of interest "in promoting the

155. 95-660 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1996), 676 So. 2d 866.
156. La. Civ. Code arts. 1968, 2030, 2033 (1984).
The contract whose enforcement is against public policy is absolutely null
and deemed never to have existed and the parties are to be placed back in
the position they enjoyed before the contract. Even if performance has
been rendered under the contract, it may not be recovered by the
performing party who knew or should have known ofthe defect that makes
the contract null.
La. Civ. Code art. 2033.
157. Sanders,95-660, 676 So.2d at 870.
158. Harriet S. Daggett, Legal Essays on Family Law, The Action for Breach of
the Marriage Promise 39-100 (1935); Planiol, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil §§
781 etseq., at 454 (La. State Law Institute, trans. 1959). Interestingly, most of the
common law states in the United States have abandoned the action. See text
accompanying supranote 138.
159. Sanders, 95-660, 676 So.2d at 870, relying upon Corbin on Contracts §
1475, at 619.
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continued existence of marriage . . . .""0 Predictably, the plaintiff
alleged that the state's lack of interest was reflected in the increasing
laxity of divorce laws. The majority of the court responded that
"[w]hile we recognize that divorce is now easier to obtain legally we
also recognize that the institution of marriage is still guarded by
public policy provisions. 1 61 Relying upon Louisiana jurisprudence
as recent as 1974,162 the court declared that "[i]n keeping with this
policy of the law, every attempt should be made to reconcile
estranged couples.' 63 In reasserting the public interest in marriage,
the author of the majority decision opined that "[t]he marriage
contract affects not only the parties involved, but also their posterity
and the good order of society."'" Furthermore, she observed that the
obligations imposed upon the two spouses during marriage are owed
not only to each other but also to society. 65 Thus, any contract in
which the defendant promised to end his marriage was "in direct
opposition to Mr. Gore's [defendant's] obligations under La. Civ.
Code art. 98. '' I66 Those obligations imposed by Article 98 include
fidelity, support and assistance. Presumably, in the eyes ofthe court,
the defendant violated his obligation of fidelity, ordinarily defined
under the jurisprudence as the obligation not to share one's sexual
potential with another, by promising to marry the third person with
whom he was indeed sharing his sexual potential. In essence, the
author of the majority opinion extended fidelity to incorporate
violations of trust, which after all is the dictionary's definition of
fidelity, between spouses caused by, or growing out of, a spouse's
adultery.
One judge concurred in the result and another dissented. The
concurring judge observed that the historical reason why one who
was married could not promise to marry another was because
marriage was indissoluble, the result of"the influence ofthe Catholic
Church on the civil law of European and other countries, and on the

160. Id. at 871.
161. Id.
162. Succession of Butler, 294 So. 2d 512, 514 (La. 1974): "The law's attitude
toward the marriage relation has been stated as follows: '[p]ublic policy, good
morals, the highest interest ofsociety require that the marriage relation should be
surrounded with every safeguard and their severance allowed only for the causes
specified by the law, and clearly proven."'
163. Sanders,95-660, 676 So.2d at 871. The court cited Meyer v. Howard, 136
So. 2d 805 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
164. Id.
165. La. Civ. Code art. 98, comment (e) (1987). These obligations are matters
of public order from which the parties may not derogate by their contract.
166. Sanders, 95-660, 676 So. 2d at 872.

2003]

KATHERINE SHA W SPAHT

English law until King Henry VIII.' 67 After eruditely tracing the
history of divorce, a practice inimical to marriage as an institution,
the concurring judge declared that "[t]he idea ofthe indissolubility
of
16
marriage has disappeared in the civil law of Louisiana.
Divorce is almost as easy to get in Louisiana today as it was
in ancient Roman times ...[A] divorce is now obtainable
based solely on living separate and apart for 180 days...
[traces history of repeal of laws covered in text of this
article 169] The State has no interest in forcing one married
person to stay married to one to whom he or she does not
want to be married and it is doubtful that forcing them to
remain married would be conducive to the family concept.
Thomason v. Thomason, 355 So. 2d 908 (La. 1978).
Contracts with concubines are no longer against public policy
•.."[T]he state has made divorce so easy that it may be
unrealistic to consider marriage to be more stable than
concubinage; indeed, the state has virtually abandoned its
policy of encouraging only long-term, stable marriages."' 7 °
The ideal remains the same, but in today's divorce court a
judge who tries to dissuade a person from obtaining a divorce
is all too often considered as meddling in an affair that is none
ofhis business. In assessing public policy, the recent changes
in attitude toward marriage and divorce cannot be ignored.17'
Nonetheless, the concurring judge ultimately concluded that the
contract is against public policy. As his reasoning reflects, even
though divorce inflicts the ultimate damage upon marriage, the
involvement of a third person to whom an enforceable obligation is
owed to get a divorce from one's spouse is simply too threatening to
the institution of marriage: "However free a person may be to
terminate, unilaterally, his or her own marriage, it is something else
when a third person steps in and after making the termination of
another's marriage the subject of a contract, wants damages for the
breach of it."'
Rather than discouraging a third person's
involvement in breaking up a marriage, such as the action of
alienation of affections did,' recognizing a legal obligation to
167. Id. at 876.
168. Id. He points out that even the word is gone since Louisiana Civil Code
article 101 (1987) uses the word "terminate," rather than "dissolve."
169. See text accompanying supranotes 46-92.
170. Quoting from Katherine Shaw Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave, 16 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise-Matrimonial Regimes § 8.3, at 369 (1989).
171. Sanders v. Gore, 95-660 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1996), 676 So. 2d 866, 877.
172. Id. at 878.
173. See supra note 64 for an excellent article discussing the action for
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divorce a spouse as promised in a contract would encourage a third
person's involvement.
The dissenting judge, suffice it to say, relied upon the statement
from the Thomason case highlighted in the excerpt quoted by the
concurring judge. "Divorcing" the statement from the context of the
facts in the Thomasoncase meant that the statement could be broadly
construed to support the proposition that the state does not have an
interest, literally, "in forcing one spouse to remain married to
another."' 74 Yet, the statement should not be divorced from its
historical' 75 and factual context: the Thomason case involved two
spouses, each of whom were guilty of fault entitling the other to a
divorce. The application of the judicially created doctrine of
recrimination produced the result that neither spouse in the Thomason
case could obtain a divorce. As the dissenting judge correctly
observed, "[t]he recrimination doctrine resulted in the denial of a
divorce in cases where both parties were equally guilty, thereby
sentencing them to continue as a married couple even though they
proved they were incompatible."'7 Two spouses who had each
seriously breached their marital obligations and under applicable law
were denied a divorce is an entirely different situation from one
spouse seeking a divorce from the other who has in no way breached
his marital obligations. Nonetheless, the dissenting judge combined
the statement in Thomason with the simplification of the divorce
process in 1990 to reach the conclusion that "[p]ermitting a married
person to contract to marry another does not violate public policy
because the State does not have an interest in forcing a spouse to
'
remain married to his or her spouse." 177
Although the sexual and gender assumptions made in the early
jurisprudence concerning breach of the promise to marry may no
longer exist, the action remains viable and some general notion of
fault on the part of the "jilted" fianc6 replaces earlier defenses.
alienation of affections.
174. Sanders, 95-660, 676 So. 2d 866 at 881. It must be remembered that the
Thomason decision was rendered in 1978 at the peak of the easing of divorce laws.
The no-fault divorce revolution began in 1970 and by 1975, three years before the
Thomason case was decided, no-fault divorce had been enacted in virtually every
state in the United States. In addition the empirical data had not yet revealed the
devastation the "divorce revolution" had wreaked on women and children, first
reported by Lenore Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social
and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America (1985) and since
confirmed by so many others, including Judith S. Wallerstein, Julia M. Lewis, &
Sandra Blakeslee, The Unexpected Legacy ofDivorce: A 25-Year Landmark Study
(2000).
175. Sanders, 95-660, 676 So. 2d at 881.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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Furthermore, despite a steady erosion of the directly expressed
interest of society in marriage as the exclusive domain for the sexual
expression of a man and a woman, a Louisiana court has on at least
one occasion involving the breach of a promise to marry reasserted
rather confidently that indeed society has an interest in the marital
relationship--its stability and its duration. And the author of that
opinion is now a justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court.'78
2. Prerequisitesto a Valid Marriage: Who Can and Can Not
Marry
Before beginning to consider the present law on entry into and
nullity of marriage, it is important to examine the current conceptual
understanding of marriage as defined in the Civil Code. Article 86,
in recognition of the history of its predecessor,'79 defines marriage as
"a legal relationship between a man and a woman that is created by
civil contract." No longer is marriage defined as a contract; it is a
legal relationship. It is not subject to the rules governing ordinary
contracts: 8 ' "[t]he relationship and the contract are subject to special
rules prescribed by law."'' However, by utilizing the statutory
language "created by civil contract," Article 86 permits the selective
application of contractual principles if there are no otherwise
applicable "special" rules. To that extent, unanswered questions
concerning the validity of certain marriages may be answered by
general contractual principles.8 2
The definition of marriage includes specification that the
relationship is one between a man and a woman. At the turn of the
century, there was no similar reference in Civil Code article 86
concerning who might be able to contract marriage, but the
jurisprudence in distinguishing marriage from an ordinary contract
observed that it could only be contracted between a man and a
woman."8 3 Not until 1975 r ' did Article 88 include a reference to
178. Judge Jeannette Knoll of the Third Circuit Court ofAppeal who authored
the opinion in Sanders v. Gore is now a member ofthe Louisiana Supreme Court.
179. La. Civ. Code art. 86, comment (a) (1987): "This provision effects no
change in the substance of the source provisions... In particular, the import of
Article 86 of the Civil Code of 1870 remains unchanged: the law views marriage
as purely a civil matter, and not as one subject to the operation of religious or
ecclesiastical law ......

180. La. Civ. Code art. 86, comment (c) (1987).
181. La. Civ. Code art. 86.
182. See discussion in Spaht, supra note 115.
183. Hurry v. Hurry, 144 La. 877, 885, 81 So. 378, 380 (1919): "The consent
of the parties is required, but it can only be contracted between a male and a female
184.

1975 La. Acts No. 361, § 1amended La. Civ. Code art. 88.
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marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman. The
redactors believed that marriage was a natural institution;"8 5 thus no
definition was necessary. Applying the principles of natural law,
there was no question that marriage could onlybe contracted between
male and female; they were created physically by design in a sexually
complementary manner. 8 6 To include language that marriage is a
relationship between a man and a woman was redundant, for to define
marriage in any other way would be oxymoronic. However, over the
last twenty to thirty years, the "gay rights" movement has insisted that
marriage be an institution available to them as well as to
heterosexuals.8 7 Present Louisiana law not only excludes marriage
between persons ofthe same sex bydefinition, but also reinforces that
exclusion by an explicit prohibition in Article 89, an article in which
a marriage between persons of the same sex is referred to as a
"purported" marriage.188 Furthermore, Louisiana law declares its
strong public policy on the issue" 9 and denies any civil effects
afforded by the putative marriage doctrine to such absolutely null
marriages.9' A "purported" marriage between persons of the same
185. John Witte, Jr., An Apt and Cheerful Conversationon Marriage,Sixth
Distinguished Faculty Lecture at Emory University at 3 (Feb. 2001): "And
marriage is a naturalinstitution,subject to the natural laws taught by reason and
conscience, nature and custom."
Even proponents of broadening the definition of marriage and family recognize
marriage historically as a natural institution: "Heterosexuality was the unquestioned
call of nature.. ." Harry Krause & David D. Meyer, What Familyfor the 21st
Century?, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 101 (2002).
186. David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the
MeaningofMarriage,38 So. Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1997).
187. This whole movement supported by elite opinion, especially in prestigious
national law reviews, will be addressed in the second article by the author that
discusses the revolution and counter revolution concerning marriage law and the
future of marriage as an institution, enshrined, protected and privileged in the law.
See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The Futureof
Marriagein theLaw,_
Loy. L. Rev. _ (2003) (publication forthcoming). Just
one recent example of such writing is Harry D. Krause & David D. Meyer, What
Familyfor the 21st Century, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 101 (2002).
188. La. Civ. Code art. 89 (1987): "Persons of the same sex may not contract
marriage with each other. A purported marriage between persons of the same sex
contracted in another state shall be governed by the provisions of Title II of Book
IV of the Civil Code."
La. Civ .Code art. 3520(B) (1991, as amended by 1999 La. Acts No. 890, § 1):
"A purported marriage between persons of the same sex violates a strong public
policy ofthe state of Louisiana and such a marriage contracted in another state shall
not be recognized in this state for any purpose, including the assertion ofany right
or claim as a result of the purported marriage."
189. La. Civ. Code art. 3520(B) (1991 as amended by 1999 La. Acts No. 890
§ 1). The text ofthis paragraph appears at supranote 188.
190. La. Civ. Code art. 96 (1987): ".... A purported marriage between parties
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sex, it is safe to say, is the most reprehensible of all absolutely null
marriages under present law and even more reprehensible than a
marriage between an adulterer and his accomplice under earlier
provisions of Louisiana law."9
Even more importantly, when considering the present law on
entry into marriage, whether the legal provision involves a
prerequisite or a nullity, it is critically important to place those rules
within the context of a new reality--easy divorce. The relaxation of
rules governing divorce removes the pressure on grounds for nullity
of a marriage. In many instances obtaining a divorce by summary
proceedings 180 days after filing a petition simply alleging the desire
for a divorce 9 2 will be faster and will result in a more certain remedy
than seeking annulment of a marriage which requires an ordinary
proceeding for very specific grounds stated in the legislation. Thus,
it is unremarkable that most cases in which the issue of nullity is
raised are divorce actions in which one spouse alleges that the
marriage is null. The only advantage to filing a suit for nullity or to
raising nullity as a defense to an action for divorce is in the case of an
absolutely null marriage'93 ifthe other spouse was not in good faith.'94
The spouse in bad faith is not entitled to the civil effects of the
marriage,' 95 which include an interest in community property,'96
spousal support after judgment of nullity,' 97 and other claims
available only to a spouse at termination of the marriage.' 98
The legislation, unlike its turn-of-the-century predecessor, now
incorporates the judicial interpretation of the effects of a relatively
null marriage: "[a] relatively null marriage produces civil effects until
it is declared null."'9 By producing civil effects until the marriage is
declared null, the legislation, just as previous jurisprudence, continues
to distinguish a relatively null marriage from a relatively null contract;

of the same sex does not produce any civil effects."
See alsoLa. Civ. Code art. 89, comment (d) (1987 as amended by 1999 La. Acts
No. 890 § 1).
191. See text accompanying supranotes 64-70 for a discussion ofLa. Civ. Code

art. 161 (1870).
192. La. Civ. Code art. 102, comment (b)(1990).
193. La. Civ. Code art. 94 (1987).
194. La. Civ. Code art. 96 (1987).
195.

La. Civ. Code art. 152 (1993).

(1993).
196. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2338.

Compare with La. Civ. Code art. 151

197. La. Civ. Code arts. 152, 111-117.
198. For example, a claim for contributions to the education or training of a
spouse. La. Civ. Code arts. 121-124.
199. La. Civ. Code art. 97 (1987). Comment: "This Article is new, but it does
not change the law.. .. "
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the latter is deemed never to have existed.2"
Furthermore,
confirmation ofa relatively null marriage after recovering one's liberty
or discernment is no longer limited simply to cohabitation;
confirmation ofthe marriage may occur by express declaration2 1 as in
the case ofan ordinary contract which is relatively null.20 2 The changes
simply make confirmation ofa relatively null marriage easier, and after
all, relatively null marriages are those which involve laws for the
protection of private persons. This legal change which makes a
relatively null marriage easier to affirm and convert to a valid marriage
is not inconsistent with apolicy ofpromoting marriage as an institution.
Developed for the purpose of protecting the innocent spouse and
the children of an absolutely null marriage, the putative marriage
doctrine has changed in two important respects since the turn of the
century, one which is obvious and the other less obvious. Even though
the doctrine only applies if a spouse is in "good faith" at the time the
marriage was contracted 203 and, as a general rule, the civil effects last
only as long as a spouse's good faith, the 1987 legislation extends civil
effects beyond the moment that good faith ceases, in one special set of
circumstances: "[w]hen the cause of the nullity is one party's prior
undissolved marriage, the civil effects continue in favor of the other
party, regardless of whether the latter remains in good faith, until the
marriage is pronounced null or the latter party contracts a valid
marriage. 2 °4 The general rule, which only extends civil effects as long
as good faith lasts, was intended to motivate the spouses to act and
either stop living together in the case ofan incestuous union or cure the
defect and marry again in the case of a bigamous union. For marriages
reprehensible to society, the parties should be encouraged to end them,
and terminating the civil effects at the moment the innocent party has
knowledge or is put on notice of the impediment assures the

200. La. Civ. Code art. 2031 (1984).
201. La. Civ. Code art. 95 (1984). See comment (c) to Article 95:
This Article changes prior law by substituting the broader term 'confirm'
for the phrase 'cohabit together' used by Article 111 of the Civil Code of
1870 in specifying the means of validating a relatively null marriage...
Proof that the parties have lived together as man and wife will continue to
be persuasive evidence that the one whose consent was initially defective
subsequently intended that a valid marriage should subsist, but the use of
the broader term in this Article also permits the application of certain
general obligations principles regarding confirmation of contracts. For
instance, under Civil Code article 1842 (rev. 1984) a party who had
married under duress could confirm the marriage by express declaration.
202. La. Civ. Code art. 1842 (1984).
203. La. Civ. Code art. 96 (1987): "An absolutely null marriage nevertheless
produces civil effects in favor of a party who contracted it in good faith for as long
as that party remains in good faith ...
204. Id.
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accomplishment of society's objectives. °5 The special extension of
civil effects in favor ofa spouse who contracted a bigamous marriage
in good faith and was not the spouse who was already married
continues to protect the party who has no dispositive power "to rectify
the nullity (by divorcing his former spouse and remarrying his present
one)." 2' The result of the special extension is to deny to the spouse
who despite his own impediment marries, the power to terminate the
civil effects that flow to the other spouse by simply confessing to his
prior undissolved marriage.20 7

Less obvious than the statutory change protecting an "innocent"
spouse from the cessation ofcivil effects is the increasingly forgiving
nature of the judiciary in deciding what constitutes "good faith," the
prerequisite to the flow of civil effects from an absolutely null
marriage. "Good faith" has always been defined as "an honest and
reasonable belief that there exists no legal impediment to a
marriage. ' ,2 ' Early in the twentieth century, judges generally were
demanding upon spouses who found themselves in absolutely null
marriages and who claimed to have had a reasonable belief that no
impediment existed to the marriage. In particular, the jurisprudence
insisted that if one spouse knew that the other spouse had been
married at one time, it was incumbent upon the spouse claiming a
reasonable belief, thus "good faith," to have conducted some sort of
investigation before accepting the assurances ofthe other spouse that
his former marriage had terminated. 0 After intervening decisions
which made increasing exceptions for unintelligent and
unsophisticated spouses"'0 (and even their families2 ') who claimed
205. La. Civ. Code art. 96, comment (b).
206. Id.
207. Spaht, supranote 115:
The Committee [Persons Committee ofthe Louisiana State Law Institute]
felt that the spouse whose impediment caused the nullity should remain
motivated to cure the defective marriage, either by remarrying the putative
spouse once the impediment is removed or by obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity. The other 'innocent' spouse can only rectify the
defect by obtaining a judicial declaration ofnullity. Furthermore, if civil

effects cease upon receiving information concerning the impediment, the
spouse whose impediment caused the absolutely null marriage may control
the flow of civil effects to the other spouse...
Id. at 1152-53.
208. La. Civ. Code art. 96, comment (d) (1987): "This Article is not intended
to disturb
the prior jurisprudence construing the term 'good faith' in this context
1,
209. See, e.g., Succession of Taylor, 39 La. Ann. 823, 2 So. 581 (La. 1887),
discussedin Succession ofMarinoni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797,810-12 (La. 1935)
(Odom, J,dissenting).
210. Eddy v. Eddy, 271 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972). Later the same
treatment was afforded to the wife in Mara v. Mara, 452 So. 2d 329 (La. App. 4th
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they were in "good faith," the Louisiana Supreme Court in Gathright
v. Smith212 affirmed the decision of the trial court that a husband who
knew his wife had been married twice and simply relied upon her
statements that those marriages were dissolved was in "good faith."
Even more recently, in Alfonso v. Alfonso 213 the wife in a bigamous
marriage relied on the statement by the husband that his marriage to
his first wife was dissolved, but she also depended upon a document
written in Spanish and delivered to her while in Honduras to mean
that they were married. The court concluded that she was in "good
faith," having possessed an honest and reasonable belief that there
was no impediment to the marriage and that she indeed was married
even though there was no ceremony.
Of course, having strict standards as to what constitutes a
reasonable beliefthat no impediment to a marriage exists discourages
persons from entering into absolutely null marriages without
investigating the other spouse's statements. In the past, the judiciary
apparently considered it part of their responsibility to society to
discourage marriages which their elected representatives deemed
reprehensible and injurious to the public good. By "softening up" the
standards for "good faith" over the last one hundred years, the
judiciary retreated from punishing parties to absolutely null marriages
by means of withholding the civil effects of marriage. Maybe the
reason was because in an increasingly mobile society it is hard to
know and determine the background of a potential spouse. This
reason, however, becomes less convincing as methods of
communication and means ofgathering information at the end of the
twentieth century have proven to be superior to those methods
available at the beginning ofthe century. A more plausible reason is
that the judiciary became less convinced that an absolutely null
marriage was reprehensible to society at large and the remedy of
divorce was quick and easy to obtain.
3. Partieswith An Impediment to Marriage: Absolute Nullity
Rather than formulate the prohibitions against marriages that are
absolutely null as inability to contract marriage, 2 14 present law
considers the prohibitions as impediments to marriage. 25 The
Cir. 1984).
211. Succession of Barbier, 296 So. 2d 390 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
212. 368 So. 2d 679 (La. 1978).
213. 99-261 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1999), 739 So.2d 946.
214. La. Civ. Code art. 90 (1870). See text accompanying supranotes 46-57.
215. La. Civ. Code art. 87 (1987): "The requirements for the contract of
marriage are:
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change in language was purposeful; an incapacity to contract
ordinarily produces a relatively null contract,216 yet in the case of the
marriage contract, an incapacity results in an absolutely null
marriage.217 Furthermore, incapacity of a contracting party suggests
a law that is intended for the purpose of protecting the individual
rather than protecting public order and good morals. Consistent with
the notion that an incapable party is prevented from contracting
because the law protects him from obligating himself, he also may
confirm what he did upon the termination of his incapacity,
effectively waiving the protection the law afforded him.2 ' Thus, for
purposes of marriage, persons who prior to 1987 were considered
unable to contract marriage were not in the general theoretical sense
incapable; their marriages were prohibited because such marriages
violated strong public policy. Therefore, the redactors of Article 87
chose a different term to express the category of marriages which if
contracted would result in an absolute nullity-marriages to which
there was an impediment.2"9
As mentioned earlier "purported" marriages between persons of
the same sex are now explicitly prohibited.2 Such "purported"
marriages are considered by Louisiana law as the most reprehensible
ofthe absolutely null marriages: the parties are denied the application
of the putative marriage doctrine, hence any civil effects of
marriage, 22' and such a "purported" marriage contracted in another
state is not entitled to recognition in Louisiana.2 The first of only
two other changes to a category of absolutely null marriages clarified
the prohibition against marrying relatives: the prohibition applies
even if the relationship is created by adoption. 223 The second
alteration to the same prohibition is more substantive: withjudicial
approval, collaterals related only by adoption may marry. 2 4 The
source provision for this change exists in the Quebec Civil Code.225
Although the article itself offers no substantive criteria to guide the
The
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

absence of legal impediment ......
La. Civ. Code art. 2031 (1984).
La. Civ. Code art. 94 (1987). See also La. Civ. Code art. 113 (1870).
La. Civ. Code art. 1842 (1984).
La. Civ. Code art. 87 (1987). See text of article supranote 215.
La. Civ. Code art. 89 (1987 as amended by 1999 La. Acts No. 890 § 1).
La. Civ. Code art. 96 (1987).
La. Civ. Code art. 3520(B) (1991 as amended by 1999 La. Acts No. 890

§ 1).
223. La. Civ. Code art. 90 (1987): "...The impediment exists whether the
persons are related by consanguinity or by adoption ......
224. Id. "Nevertheless, persons related by adoption, though not by blood, in the
collateral line within the fourth degree may marry each other if they obtainjudicial
authorization in writing to do so."
225. Quebec Civ. Code art. 406.
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judge in the exercise of his discretion in authorizing such a
marriage, the official comment to the article does: "In deciding
whether to do so, [authorize the marriage] thejudge should consider
whether the policy of preserving family harmony will be advanced
or impeded by the proposed union. .. ""6 Thus, the law prohibiting
incestuous marriages was liberalized only to the following limited
extent: those within the collateral line related by adoption only who
are prohibited from marrying may now obtainjudicial authorization
to marry.
To a far greater degree, the legislative repeal fifteen years earlier
of the prohibition against an adulterer marrying his accomplice in
adultery liberalized the law of absolutely null marriages. No other
prohibition protected an existing marriage to the same extent,
especially when coupled with extremely restrictive grounds for
divorce. At the same time, the law prohibiting a "purported" samesex marriage enacted in 1987 is the strongest prohibition ever
enacted in Louisiana law.227 It is as if after relenting on almost all
prohibitions except bigamy and incest the legislature drew an
emphatic line in the sand at same-sex "marriage," suggesting
liberalization would go no further. Whether that line in the sand
remains or shifts like the sand in which it is drawn is yet to be
determined.228
4. MarriageCeremony: Absolute Nullity
Although earlier jurisprudence concluded that a "marriage"
without a ceremony is an absolutely null marriage,229 the Civil Code
was not explicit. Present law is. Under Civil Code article 91, the
parties, who must be physically present, 23' are obligated to
participate in a marriage ceremony performed by a third person. If
they do not, the marriage is absolutely null.23 '
226. La. Civ. Code art. 90 comment (e) (1987).
227. See text accompanying supranotes 220-222.
228. In her review ofNancy Cott's book Public Vows (supranote 1), Ann Estin
writes: "Over time, if public opinion continues to shift, same-sex marriage will no
longer be so unthinkable ....
By comparison [to interracial marriage and
liberalization of divorce laws], the debate over same-sex marriage has progressed
remarkably quickly." Estin, 100 Mich. L. Rev. at 1704.
In note 48 on page 1704, Estin cites Kenji Yoshino, Covering,111 Yale L.J. 769,
783-84 (2002), to the following effect: ".... that movement for gay rights has
moved further and faster than any previous movement.".
229. See text accompanying supranotes 98-99.
230. La. Civ. Code art. 91 (1987). See also La. Civ. Code art. 92 (1987): "A
marriage may not be contracted by procuration."
231. La. Civ. Code art. 94 (1987): "A marriage is absolutely null when
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To an extent it can be argued that Article 91 is more restrictive
than prior law because it specifies that the third person be qualified,
which occurs by being a registered232 member of the clergy233 or a
judge,234 or "reasonably believed by the parties to be qualified" to
perform the ceremony.
Prior jurisprudence considered the
qualification and registration of a celebrant as a formality that was
merely directory thus not affecting the validity of the marriage.2 35 A
person reasonably believed by the parties to be qualified does not
require that the officiant be factually qualified, only that the parties
are reasonable in believing that he is. "The change in statutory
language to encompass such a celebrant was in response to the fact
that a Louisiana officiant not authorized by law to perform marriage
ceremonies did so and no one was certain that the marriages were
valid., 236 As the comments explain, "A 'person . . .reasonably
believed by the spouses to be qualified' to perform a marriage
ceremony may include any member ofthe class of persons generally
recognized as empowered to perform such ceremonies, whether ornot
properly registered to do so."'
The expressed motivation for this
extension of protection was to prevent the nullity of a marriage for
purely "technical reasons" beyond the spouses' control,238 such as the
expiration of a bond to be posted by a justice of the peace.
5.FreeConsent ofthe Parties: Relative Nullity
Civil Code article 93, which contains the instances in which
consent to a marriage is not free, incorporates the more specific
consent given to a ravisher under prior law 2 into the word duress.
Duress replaced violence or threats 240 in the law of conventional

contracted without a marriage ceremony....
232. La. R.S. § 9:204 (1987).
233. La. R.S. §§ 9:201-02 (1987 as amended by 1997 La. Acts No. 73 § 1).
234. La. R.S. §§ 9:202-03 (1987 as amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 341 § 1; La.
Acts. 2001 No. 1103 § 1; La. Acts. 2002 1st Ex. Sess. No. 60 § 1).
235. See text accompanying supranotes 94-96.
236. Spaht, supranote 115, at 1141.
237. La. Civ. Code art. 91, comment (c) (1987).
238. Id.: ". . . The expression may be broadly construed to prevent the
annulment of marriages for technical reasons reasonably beyond the control of the
intended spouses."
239. La. Civ. Code art. 91 (1870).
240. La. Civ. Code art. 1959, comment (b) (1984): "... In sum, 'duress' is a
word of art or technical word in the English language which expresses exactly what
is meant by 'violence or threats' in Civ. Code arts. 1850-1852 (1870). Its adoption
in this revision is not intended to incorporate notions incompatible with that
meaning."

284

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63

obligations and has an established meaning under the Civil Code.2 4'
However, Article 93 omits reference to a "mistake respecting the
person" which appeared in its predecessor, Article 91.24' The term
"mistake respecting the person" had been interpreted by prior
jurisprudence so narrowl 2 43 that it was considered an obsolete
phrase. Furthermore, to include a term such as error would, as
warned by the court in Delpit v. Young, 244 create instability in all
marriages because ofthe term's breadth.2 45 Nonetheless, Article 93
does not declare that the instances of lack of free consent are
exclusive so it is possible to argue in an aggravated case "involving
mistake in physical identity" that resort to general principles of
conventional obligations is appropriate to permit annulment of the
marriage.246
Article 93, enacted in 1987, added a new instance where consent
is not freely given: consent given by a person who is incapable of
discernment. 4 7 Although being deprived ofreason is for purposes of
general contract law an incapacity2 48 producing a relatively null
contract,2 49 Louisiana marriage law considers an incapacity to discern
as a party's failure to freely consent." As a result, the marriage, like
the ordinary contract, is relatively null.25' Prior to 1987, the law of
marriage contained in the Civil Code was not explicit about the result
of a marriage contracted by one party who was insane or under the
influence of drugs or alcohol. However, the jurisprudence in dicta
declared that the marriage could only be annulled by the party who
241. La. Civ. Code arts. 1959-1963 (1984).
242. See text accompanying supranote 111.
243. See text accompanying supranote 112.
244. See text accompanying supra notes 112-116, and the quoted language in
the text accompanying supra note 117.
245. For example, see Vemeiuille v. Verneuille, 438 So. 2d 615 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1983) (husband sought annulment of marriage because of his error as to the
entireidentity ofhis wife who was pregnant when he married her but only revealed
the child was not his when the child was born).
246. Spaht, supranote 217, at 1145:
[A]n aggravated case involving a mistake in physical identity could be
resolved by resort to the general articles on error. A justification for
resorting to those articles is that article 86 defines marriage as a
relationship created by civil contract. The words civil contract were used
for two reasons: (1) To demonstrate the historical assertion ofjurisdiction
over marriage by secular authorities and (2) To permit analogy to the law
of conventional obligations when appropriate.
247. The source of this new provision was Quebec Civ. Code art. 425 (rev.
1981).
248. La. Civ. Code art. 1918 (1984).
249. La. Civ. Code arts. 1919, 2031, 2033 (1984).
250. La. Civ. Code art. 93 (1987).
251. La. Civ. Code art. 95 (1987).
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was insane or his legal representative.252 Such a conclusion meant
that the marriage was to be treated as a relative nullity, thus
presumably as a matter of defective consent.
Arguably, present law is more permissive by explicitly permitting
the annulment of a marriage because of incapacity to discern, a
condition which constitutes more than a mere lack ofjudgment but
arguably less than deprived ofreason. However, it can also be argued
that the inclusion of"incapable ofdiscernment" merely codified prior
jurisprudence"' and offered asolution to unanswered questions about
the validity of marriages contracted by a person under the influence
of alcohol or drugs."' In response to the argument that the Article
merely codified prior jurisprudence, it must also be noted that
"incapable of discernment" was intended to permit a judge to
examine the marriage ofminors to determine whether in a particular
case the minor understood his action in consenting to marriage.255 To
this extent, present law delegates to thejudge the possibility ofsetting
a minimum age in a specific case below which a particular minor did
not freely consent, which constitutes a change in prior law at least as
judicially interpreted.256 It would be accurate in summary to state that
at least, as concerns a party's freedom of consent, present law, with
252. See text accompanying supranotes 120-123.
253. La. Civ. Code art. 93, comment (c) (1987): "...
As under prior
jurisprudence, under this Article insanity is viewed as creating a lack of free
consent, rather than a lack of capacity to contract marriage; so only the insane
spouse may seek annulment of such a marriage. .. "
254. La. Civ. Code art. 93, comment (d) (1987): "A 'person incapable of
discernment' may include, but is not limited to, a person under the influence of
alcohol or drugs, a mentally retarded person. ..."
255. See La. Civ. Code art. 93, comment (d) (1987): "A 'person incapable of
discernment' may include, but is not limited to,.. . a person who is too young to
understand the consequences of the marriage celebration."
256. Spaht, supranote:
Just as under prior law, the officiant is directed not to perform a marriage
in which a party is a minor unless '... . the minor has the written consent
to marry ofboth of his parents, or of the tutor ofhis person, or of a person
who has been awarded custody ofthe minor.' Ifthe minor is under the age
of sixteen, he or she must also obtain judicial authorization to marry. The
choice to continue the presentjurisprudential rule concerning the marriage
of minors was conscious. The Committee [Persons Committee of the
Louisiana State Law Institute] chose to preserve the validity of such
marriages because, given the frequency ofthe marriage ofminors, serious
social problems could result from a law pronouncing the nullity of such a
marriage.
Id. at 1136.
"... Since there is no minimum age below which a marriage of minors will be
considered null, the Committee considered it advisable to permit the court to
examine the consent to marriage by a minor to determine if he was too young to
understand the consequences of the celebration. ..." Id. at 1146.
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a few minor exceptions, is neither more permissive nor more
restrictive than the law at the turn of the century.
6. Other Statutory Requirements: Valid Marriage
Other ceremonial requirements, other than the provisions
requiring a ceremony and a qualified officiant contained in the Civil
Code, are merely directory consistent with past jurisprudence. Their
placement in the Revised Statutes as opposed to the Civil Code was
intended to convey the directory nature of those provisions and to
signal that a failure to comply with them does not affect the validity
of a marriage.257 The ceremonial provisions include "those relating
to the issuance and presentation of marriage licenses, 258 the
registration of officiants, 259 the reqluisite number of witnesses to the
ceremony and their qualifications, and the written act ofcelebration
of the marriage .... 261 In addition, the Revised Statutes contain the
provision requiring that seventy-two hours elapse between issuance
of the license and performance of the ceremony, 262 the provisions on
filing ofan opposition to a marriage, 263 and the provisions regulating
record-keeping.26
Even though the number of witnesses to the ceremony and the
presentation of a medical certificate were formalities previously
considered to be merely directory, substantive changes throughout the
twentieth century, even as recently as the 1980s, suggest liberalization
of the law of entry into marriage. No longer are three witnesses to a
marriage ceremony required, only two. But of far greater
significance, no'longer is a medical certificate required that contains
an attestation by a physician that a party does not suffer from venereal
disease or AIDS. The latter formality required
prior to issuance of a
21,
marriage license was repealed in 1988.
Part ofthe explanation for
257. La. Civ. Code art. 91, comment (a) (1987):
This Article clarifies but does not change the law. It reflects the prior
jurisprudential rule that the articles ofthe Civil Code of 1870 that set forth
the formalities of marriage were only directory to officiants. An
officiant's failure to comply with any other ceremonial provision than is
imposed by Article 87 and this Article may subject him to civil sanction
...but it will not invalidate the resulting marriage.
258. La. R.S. §§ 9:205, 221-225, 226-228, 234-236 (2003).
259. La. R.S. § 9:204 (2003).
260. La. R.S. § 9:244 (2003).
261. La. R.S. § 9:245 (2003). See La. Civ. Code art. 91, comment (b) (1987).
262. La. R.S. §§ 9:241-243 (2003).
263. La. R.S. §§ 9:261-262 (2003).
264. La. R.S. §§ 9:251-256 (2003).
265. 1988 La. ActsNo. 345 § 1; 1988 La. ActsNo. 808 §2; 1988 La. ActsNo. 973 § 1).
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the repeal of the requirement of a medical certificate was the cost of
testing for AIDS in 1988. The argument was also made that testing
for AIDS served merely to discriminate against those with this
devastating disease. If the AIDS testing was to be eliminated, the
rationale proceeded, why should any testing for venereal disease be
required. After all, of the sexually transmitted diseases, AIDS was
and still is, by far the most serious.
The repeal coincided with an explosion of sexually transmitted
diseases in the United States, such as herpes, and the lack of
widespread knowledge and information about at-risk populations for
the newly diagnosed disease of AIDS. Apparently, there was no
consideration given to one of the purposes of the medical certificate,
that is, to provide information to the parties about each other's sexual
history and the risk of exposure to a spouse's sexually transmitted
disease. By 1988, there may have been an assumption that all couples
who may have needed such information had already been sexually
intimate and that to require a medical certificate and public disclosure
would violate a party's privacy. There may also have been concern
that many of the newly diagnosed sexually transmitted diseases, such
as herpes or AIDS, have no known cure; therefore, the obstacle of
requiring a medical certificate could prevent the infected person from
ever marrying.
The repeal of the requirement of a medical certificate represents
one more example of retreating from legal regulation of the sexual
conduct of parties who desire to enter marriage. The repeal also
communicates that the sexual conduct of parties to an intended
marriage is a private matter beyond the interest of the public. Can
one legitimately argue that sexually transmitted diseases are not
matters of public concern? If the public is concerned with marriage
at all, such as in granting licenses to marry and in regulating who may
marry, can a person argue that the public has no interest in assuring
that those persons who do marry are free of disease? From a different
perspective, what distinguishes sexually transmitted diseases and the
risk they pose to the disease-free spouse and children of the marriage
from other diseases, particularly genetically transmitted ones? Is
there some inherent connection between sex and marriage that makes
freedom from sexually transmitted diseases more relevant than other,
even hereditary, diseases? Would knowing a prospective spouse has
a sexually transmitted disease more seriously affect the decision to
marry than knowing a spouse carries the breast cancer gene? Or, has
science only now perfected genetic testing to the extent that such
information can be obtained?
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Ill. LEGAL REGULATION OF THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP

A. HistoricalRegulationof the MaritalRelationship
At the turn of the century until the passage of the Married
Women's Emancipation legislation during the period of 1916 to
1928,266 a wife fell under the authority of her husband and was
required to obtain his authorization, concurrence or consent to certain
civil acts.267 She was deemed to suffer a civil incapacity coextensive
with her need for her husband's authorization. Historically, the
incapacity of the married woman had little to do with age or maturity
ofjudgment; it was based on the notion that "the husband was the
head of the family 68 and therefore had an interest in supervising his
wife's activities. 2 69 Even after the passage of the emancipation
legislation, wives who were under eighteen years of age or interdicted
remained under their husband's authority until 1974.70 Even though
the husband's marital power and the correlative incapacity ofthe wife
existed for patrimonial reasons rather than personal reasons, both the
power and the incapacity were treated as matters of public order
rather than private order. The patrimonial reasons consisted of
assuring that the husband was indeed the "head and master" of the
" ' as to his
community and of protecting third parties from confusion27
2
authority during the existence of the community regime. 72 Hence,
the incapacity ofthe wife and resulting marital power ofthe husband
were treated "as a part of the law of marriage proper rather than as
266. That legislation now appears in La. R.S. §§ 9:101-105 (2003). The
legislation emancipates married women from the authority of their husbands. "... [I]n
no case shall any act, contract, or obligation of a married woman require, for the
validity or effectiveness thereof, the authority of her husband or of the judge." La.
R.S. § 9:101 (2003).
267. La. Civ. Code art. 1786 (1870): "The incapacity of the wife [La. Civ. Code
arts. 122-135 (1870)] is removed by the authorization ofthe husband, or, in cases
provided by law, by that of the judge." The wife, however, was permitted to
execute a will without the authorization of her husband. La. Civ. Code art. 135
(1870).
268. See La. Civ. Code art. 120 (1870) (wife bound to live with her husband and
follow him wherever he chooses to reside) and La. Civ. Code art. 216 (parents
exercise parental authority, but in case of a difference the will of the father
prevails).
269. Spaht, supra note 15, at 144.
270. La. R.S. § 9:104 (1950) was repealed by 1974 La. Acts No. 89, § 1.
271. Since 1980, the definition ofmatrimonialregime in La. Civ. Code art. 2325
establishes that the legislation affects third parties as well as the two spouses.
272. La. Civ. Code art. 2404 (1870) designated the husband as "head and
master" of the community regime. See infra note 279 for the text ofArticle 2404
(1870). Article 2404 was ultimately declared unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court in Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 101 S. Ct. 1195 (1981), one
year after the repeal of the Article by the legislature in 1979 La. Acts No. 709.
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part of the law of matrimonial regimes, '27 3 more as a personal effect
rather than as a patrimonial effect of marriage.
The authority of the husband over his wife and her civil acts was
74
extensive and applied even if the wife was separate in property"
from her husband.2 75 To appear in court,276 borrow money or contract
debts "for her separate benefit and advantage," thus binding only her
separate and paraphernal property, the wife required the authorization
of her husband and "the sanction of the judge. 277 It must be
remembered that the wife had no authority whatsoever in her personal
capacity 278 to bind community property because the husband was head
and master and the sole authority concerning the management of
community property. 279 The only exceptions to the requirement ofthe
husband's authorization of his wife's obligations was (1) to her
contracts if she was a "public merchant"28 although the exception did
not permit her to appear in court without his authorization;"' (2) "to
her contracts for necessaries for herself and family, where he does not
himself provide them; and (3) to all her other contracts, when he is
himself a party to them. 282 If the wife was a public merchant, she
could "obligate herself in anything relating to her trade; and in such
case, her husband [was] bound also, if there [existed] a community of
273. Spaht, supranote 15, at 144.
274. See present law in La. Civ. Code art. 2328 (permits spouses to adopt a
separation of property regime) and La. Civ. Code arts. 2370-2373 (contain a few
rules about the content of a separation of property regime).
275. La. Civ. Code art. 122 (1870): "The wife, even when she is separate in
estate from her husband, can not alienate, grant, mortgage, acquire, either by
gratuitous or incumbered title, unless her husband concurs in the act, or yields his
consent in writing."
276. La. Civ. Code art. 121 (1870): "The wife can not appear in court without
the authority ofher husband, although she may be a public merchant, or possess her
property separate from her husband."
277. La. Civ. Code art. 126 (1870).
278. In 1944 the wife was permitted to act as mandatary for her husband or for
the community, when authorized by her husband, as well as for third parties even
though she "be not authorized by her husband. .. ." La. Civ. Code art. 1787 (1870
as amended by 1944 La. Acts No. 49, § 1).
279. La. Civ. Code art. 2404 (1870): "The husband is the head and master of
the partnership or community of gains; he administers its effects, disposes of the
revenues which they produce, and may alienate them by an onerous title, without
the consent and permission of his wife ......
280. La. Civ. Code art. 131 (1870) contained the definition: "...
She is
considered as a public merchant, if she carries on a separate trade, but not if she
retains only the merchandise belonging to the commerce carried on by her
husband."
281. La. Civ. Code art. 121 (1870). See also text accompanying supranote 276.
282. La. Civ. Code art. 1786 (1870). Later, in 1944, La. Civ. Code art. 1787
was amended to permit the wife to act as a mandatary for a third person, mandate
being a contract, without her husband's authorization.
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property between them."2"3 She could bind her husband because his
authorization of her commercial contracts waspresumed by law, "if
he [permitted] her to trade in her own name. 28
If the husband refused to authorize his wife to appear in court,28 5
to obligate herself or to bind her separate property, the law permitted
her to seek judicial authority to act without his authorization.28 6 Ifthe
wife were living separate and apart from her husband,287 provision
was made for authorization by the judge so that he could determine
if the proposed transaction was for her benefit or instead for the
benefit ofthe husband or ofthe community. 288 Ifthe transaction was
for the benefit of the husband or of the community, the judge was
directed "not [to] give his sanction authorizing the wife to perform
the acts or incur the liabilities set forth in article 126. ' '289 Obviously,
the law intended to protect a wife who, because she was living
separate and apart from her husband, could be vulnerable to
imposition by him, a law modem-day feminists would label
"patronizing." She was otherwise protected from his imposition,
even while living with her husband, by denying her the right to
contract with her husband during the marriage, subject to only a few
narrow exceptions,29 ° and by denying her, even with her husband's
authorization, the right "to alienate her dotal property, or to become
security for his debts. 291' Even as recently as 1979, legislators were
still concerned about protecting wives from imposition by their
husbands. In 1980, spouses were afforded the right to contract

283. La. Civ. Code art. 131 (1870).
284. La. Civ. Code art. 1786 (1870).
285. La. Civ. Code art. 124 (1870).
286. La. Civ. Code art. 125 (1870): "Ifthe husband refuses to empower his wife
to contract, the wife may cause him to be cited to appear before the judge, who may
authorize her to make such contract, or refuse to empower her, after the husband has
been heard, or has made default."
287. La. Civ. Code art. 123 (1870): "The woman separated from bed and board
[judicial separation] has no need in any case of the authorization ofher husband, as
this separation carries with it not only a separation ofproperty, but a dissolution of
the community of acquets and gains."
288. La. Civ. Code art. 127 (1870).
289. La. Civ. Code art. 127 (1870).
290. La. Civ. Code art. 1790 (1870). Exceptions included (1) the three sales
contained in La. Civ. Code art. 2446 (1870)-(a) a transfer by one spouse to the
other after a judicial separation in payment of his or her rights, (b) a transfer by
husband to wife which has a legitimate cause like replacing her dotal effects that
had been alienated, (c) a transfer by a wife to her husband in payment of a sum
promised as dowry-(2) donations which were not mutual and reciprocal in the
same act (La. Civ. Code art. 1751 (1870)), and (3) mandate after 1944 (La. Civ.
Code art. 1787 (1870 as amended by 1944 La. Acts No. 49, § 1)).
291. La. Civ. Code art. 1790 (1870).
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generally during their marriage,2 92 but not if the contract was a
matrimonial agreement. If the agreement modified or altered their
matrimonial regime, 293 the legislature required the spouses to obtain
court approval " as a means of protecting the spouse whose
contributions to the marriage were largely non-economic, a
euphemism for the wife.
The underlying assumptions of the law which deemed the wife
incapable of civil acts proved to be founded principally upon and
coextensive with the husband's marital power. The wife's legal
incapacity failed to survive twenty years into the twentieth century,
yet other vestiges ofthe husband's power and authority survived until
nearly the end of the century. For example, the legal position of the
husband as "head and master" ofthe community property regime was
repealed in 1979 and replaced with an "equal management"
scheme.295 When replacing the law which made the husband "head
and master" ofthe community, the legislature carefully examined the
existing concomitant protections afforded to the wife against her
husband's abusive management of the community. Then the
legislature either extended those protections to the husband, too, such
296
as the right to reserve the income from separate property as separate
or to seek a separation of property, 297 or repealed them, such as the
right to renounce the community and be relieved of any community
liabilities.298
In 1985, the provision that required the wife to follow her
husband and reside where he so chose was repealed.299 Under that
article, the wife was obligated to follow the husband and reside where
he chose °" and in exchange for that obligation, the husband was
292. La. Civ. Code art. 1790 (1870 as amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 711).
293. La. Civ. Code art. 2328 (1979). See Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 170, at
§ 8.12 for a discussion of the distinction between a matrimonial agreement and
other contracts between spouses.
294. La. Civ. Code art. 2329 (1979). See discussion of this requirement in
Katherine Shaw Spaht & Cynthia A. Samuel, EqualManagementRevisited. 1979
LegislativeModificationsofthe 1978MatrimonialRegimesLaw, 40 La. L. Rev. 83,
100-02 (1979) to the effect that this requirement was intended to protect the spouse
whose contributions to the community were largely non-economic, i.e., the wife.
295. La. Civ. Code art. 2346 (1979). For a description of the changes wrought
by the 1979 legislation, see Spaht & Samuel, supra note 294 and Spaht &
Hargrave, supranote 170, chs. 5 and 6.
296. La. Civ. Code art. 2339 (1979). Compare with La. Civ. Code art. 2386
(1870).
297. La. Civ. Code art. 2374 (1979).
298. La. Civ. Code art. 2357 (1979). Compare with La. Civ. Code art. 2410

(1870).
299. 1985 La. Acts No. 271,§ 1. See La. Civ. Code art. 98, comment (f).

300. As a consequence, the law provided that the wife had the domicile ofher
husband. La. Civ. Code art. 39 (1870). The article was amended to delete that
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obligated to receive her and "to furnish her with whatever is required
for the convenience of life, in proportion to his means and
condition.""'' In other words, his power and authority came burdened
with a special obligation, an obligation understood to be greater than
the mutual obligation each spouse had to support the other,30 2 and an
obligation conditioned upon the wife's living with him. The
obligation of support under Article 120 required the husband to
provide his wife the "conveniences of life," not merely necessities
incorporated within the meaning of"support," which at the turn ofthe
century was significantly different. Furthermore, he was to provide
them proportionate to his means, interpreted as all of his resources
from which the wants of life can be supplied, and his condition in life,
which "meant his position in society."3' "This special obligation of
the husband had its foundation in the fact that, both by cultural
pattern and the suppletive law (that which comes into play in the
absence of contrary agreement of the parties), the husband usually
enjoyed control over some of the income from the wife's industry or
capital or both so that he might the better support the expenses ofthe
marriage.' ' 4
By 1987, with the repeal of the "head and master" law and the
repeal of the wife's legal obligation to follow her husband, Louisiana
marriage law, representing the personal rights and obligations of
spouses, and the law of matrimonial regimes, representing the
patrimonial rights and obligations of spouses, had evolved from a
patriarchal system concentrating marital power in the hands of the
husband to what many scholars today refer to as a marriage of equal
regard. Only one legal vestige of the husband'sposition as head of
the family survives, 30 5 and it is often ignored" ' and is probably
unconstitutional.307
reference by 1985 La. Acts No. 272, § 1. The article had been declared
unconstitutional in Crosby v. Crosby, 434 So. 2d 162 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
301. La. Civ. Code art. 120 (1870).
302. La. Civ. Code art. 119 (1870), now La. Civ. Code art. 98 (1987).
303. Spaht, supra note 15, at 143.
304. Id.
305. La. Civ. Code art. 216: "A child remains under the authority of his father
and mother until his majority or emancipation. In case of difference between the
parents,the authority of thefather prevails" (emphasis added). The title of the
Chapter of the Civil Code in which this article appears reflects the content of the
second paragraph-"Of Paternal [not Parental] Authority." Comparewith La. Civ.
Code art. 99 (1986). See also comment to La. Civ. Code art. 99.
La. Civ. Code art. 221; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 683, 735, 4501 which implement
the directive of the second paragraph ofArticle 216.
306. See, e.g., Stelly v. Montgomery, 347 So. 2d 1145 (La. 1977).
307. La. Const. art. 1, § 3 (1974) prohibits the arbitrary and capricious
discrimination on the basis of sex and the U.S. Const. amend. 14 prohibits the
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Although it was not a constituent part of the law regulating the
rights and duties of married persons, 3°s the law of separation and
divorce spoke directly to how spouses should conduct themselves
toward each other during marriage. Certain conduct was so egregious
and such a serious violation of one's marital obligations3 that the
law permitted the aggrieved spouse to seek a separation from bed and
board, which did not have the effect of terminating the marriage, or,
if the conduct was especially egregious, a divorce. In interpreting the
law of separation and divorce, the jurisprudence fleshed out the
meanings of "fidelity, support, and assistance" and the attitude with
which a spouse was to perform those obligations. Fidelity meant the
obligation not to share one's sexual potential with another person, a
breach of which entitled the aggrieved spouse to a judicial
separation 10 or a divorce." Over time, fidelity also acquired the
meaning of an affirmative obligation on the part of a spouse to share
his or her sexual potential with the other spouse, an unjustified breach
of which entitled the aggrieved spouse to a judicial separation for
cruel treatment, as long as it rendered the life together
insupportable."' Support meant providing the spouse with the
necessaries of life, the breach ofwhich entitled the aggrieved spouse
to a judicial separation for intentional nonsupport when the spouse
was in destitute or necessitous circumstances. Assistance under the
jurisprudence meant at least providing an ill spouse with medical
assistance,3" 4 a breach of which entitled the aggrieved spouse to a
judicial separation for cruel treatment.3 ' Another ground for judicial
separation taught spouses that in addition to the shame experienced
by the family, the ends of marriage could not be served if a spouse
was convicted of a felony and sentenced to imprisonment at hard
labor or death. 1 6 As evidence of its seriousness, the law permitted
denial of equal protection or due process of law.
308. The Respective Rights and Duties of Married Persons was contained in
Chapter 5 of Title IV of the Louisiana Civil Code (1870).
309. La. Civ. Code art. 119 (1870). Spouses owed to each other fidelity, support
and assistance. Compare with La. Civ. Code art. 98 (1987).
310. La. Civ. Code art. 138 (1) (1870).
311. La. Civ. Code art. 139 (1870).
312. La. Civ. Code art. 138(3) (1870). For representative jurisprudence, see
Von Bechmanv. Von Bechman, 386 So. 2d 910 (La. 1980); Currier v. Currier, 599
So. 2d 456 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992); Dean v. Dean, 579 So. 2d 1124 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1991), writ denied,584 So.2d 683 (La. 1991); Shenkv. Shenk, 563 So.2d 1000
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1990). See also discussion in Spaht, supra note 15, at 132-33.
313. La. Civ. Code art. 138(8) (1870).
314. Dollar v. Dollar, 159 La. 219, 105 So. 2d 296 (1925).
315. The cruel treatment had to render the life together insupportable. La. Civ.
Code art. 138(3) (1870).
316. La. Civ. Code art. 138(2) (1870). In the same spirit, but considered less
serious, and thus only a ground for judicial separation, was a spouse's being
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the aggrieved spouse to seek not only a separation but also a divorce,
the only conduct other than adultery that constituted grounds for
divorce. 317 A spouse could hardly assist the other in the common
endeavor of marriage if he or she was habitually intemperate;3"319
treated the other spouse cruelly, either physically or mentally;
attempted to kill the other spouse; 320 publicly defamed the other
spouse;321 or abandoned the other spouse by leaving the marital
domicile (or by the wife's refusing to follow the husband, which she
was obligated to d0 322), without lawful cause, and constantly refusing
to return.323
The assumption underlying the specific, articulated grounds for
separation and divorce was that the conduct of the spouses within
their marriage was a concern of the community in which they lived,
of society, beyond the direct imposition of the mutual obligations of
fidelity, support, and assistance. The spouses were to behave toward
each other civilly and compassionately so that the marriage might
serve the public interests of channeling the two adults' sexual
passions into marriage and of assuring that the acculturation of any
children born of the union be done in a cooperative and caring
manner. Each spouse was to yield to the other in sexual matters as
long as the request was reasonable and to conduct himself so as not
to bring dishonor and shame to the family formed by the marriage,
which could occur by adulterous affairs, outrageous or felonious
behavior, and constant intemperance. These conclusions are derived
from the grounds for separation and divorce as well as the
jurisprudence interpreting such statutory language as "cruel
treatment." The rest of society had expectations about a married
person's conduct and if those expectations were not met, although
deeply interested in preserving the stability of marriages,324 society
was willing to yield to the individual desires ofthe aggrieved spouse.
charged with a felony and fleeing fromjustice, ifthe plaintiff could prove that the
spouse was guilty of the felony and had fled. La. Civ. Code art. 138(7) (1870).
317. La. Civ. Code art. 139 (1870).
318. La. Civ. Code art. 138(3) (1870).
319. Id
320. La. Civ. Code art. 138(6) (1870).
321. La. Civ. Code art. 138(4) (1870).
322. La. Civ. Code art. 120 (1870).
323. La. Civ. Code art. 138(5) (1870). See also La. Civ. Code arts. 143-145
(1870).
324. La. Civ. Code art. 139 (1870). At the turn of the century, the waiting
period between a judicial separation and a divorce was one year for the spouse who
obtained the judgment of separation from bed and board and two years for the other
spouse. The lengthy period of time between separation and divorce was to
encourage reconciliation by getting the attention ofthe defendant spouse and giving
him an opportunity to rectify his behavior. See Spaht, supranote 15, at 154.
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B. PresentLaw Regulatingthe MaritalRelationship
Although there are three articles remaining in the chapter of the
Civil Code entitled "Incidents and Effects of Marriage," only one
contains the essence of legal obligations imposed upon spouses
during marriage. Article 98 contains the reciprocal obligations owed
by the spouses to each other-fidelity, support and assistance-just
like its predecessor Article 119. Fidelity continues to mean "not only
...to refrain from adultery, but also ...to submit to each other's
reasonable and normal sexual desires ....
,325 Yet, the law provides
a remedy only if the breach of the obligation concerns adultery; it
remains grounds for divorce.326 If the breach consists of a failure to
submit to the reasonable sexual desires of the other, no longer does
the possibility of a judicial separation exist;327 the sole relevance of
that conduct is that it constitutes fault for purposes of final spousal
support.328 Support and assistance continue to mean what they meant
before 1990, 32 but there is no remedy in marriage law for their
breach. Furthermore, with the repeal of Civil Code article 120 there
is no longer any explicit obligation imposed upon the spouses to live
together, which the comment to Article 98 acknowledges: "the
spouses are free to live together as necessary to fulfill their 33
obligation
0
mutually to support, assist, and be faithful to each other.,
For the economically secure spouse, the breach of almost any
marital obligation imposed by marriage law or the breach of the
standard of marital conduct previously contained in grounds for
separation 33 ' no longer creates any consequence to be suffered for that
spouse's misconduct, no matter how egregious that conduct may be.
For example, physical cruelty by a spouse in the form of domestic
abuse of the other spouse, has civil consequences only if the abuser
needs final spousal support or has children whose custody is in

325. La. Civ. Code art. 98, comment(b) (1987).

326. La. Civ. Code art. 103 (2) (1990).
327. La. Civ. Code art. 101, comment (c) (1990):

"The source Article's

reference to the effect ofseparation from bed and board has been omitted because

this revision does not provide for legal separation."
328. La. Civ. Code art. 111 (1997): "... the court may award ...
final periodic
support to a party free from fault prior to the filing of a proceeding to terminate the
marriage ....
" See Currier v. Currier, 599 So.2d 456 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992).
329. La. Civ. Code art. 98, comment (c) (1987): "The jurisprudence decided
under the source provision has held that the spouses' duty to support each other is
limited to furnishing the necessities oflife... The duty to render assistance, insofar
as it is separate from that of support, includes the personal care to be given an ill
and infirm spouse."
330. La. Civ. Code art. 98, comment (f) (1987).
331. See text accompanying supra note 324.
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dispute. 332 The only conduct of a spouse, other than adultery, for
which the marriage law offers a remedy is the commission ofa felony
and a sentence of imprisonment at hard labor or death.3 33 The remedy
is limited to divorce, however; a judicial separation is no longer
available.33 4 Thus, a spouse who may have desired a judicial
separation for religious reasons or for the sole purpose of getting the
other spouse's attention is deprived ofa choice ofremedy. Ajudicial
separation historically represented legal recognition ofthe possibility,
indeed the hope, of reconciliation by virtue of its relatively lengthy
waiting period between thejudgment ofseparation and the divorce.335
The Official Revision Comment that describes the freedom of
spouses to live together as necessary to fulfill their marital
obligations 336 capsulizes the essence of the 1987 revision: "the
revision continues a trend of permitting the private ordering of the
[marital] relationship by the spouses."' The Persons Committee of
the Law Institute when presented with the possibility of a series of
articles regulating marriage like those in the Civil Code of Quebec
rejected "greater regulation of the marital relationship. '338 Instead,
the Committee only added two other insignificant articles to the
chapter on effects of marriage: one article introduced parental
authority 339 and the other provided for the effect ofmarriage upon a
spouse's name.3 °
Three years later, in a Law Institute revision ofthe law ofdivorce,
the same penchant for private ordering appears. According to the
Persons Committee of the Law Institute, spouses divorce for very
332. La. R.S. §§ 9:361-368 (1992) (Post-Separation Family Violence Relief
Act). The remedies are available if the abused spouse can prove a history offamily
violence. Otherwise, conduct other than physical violence that would constitute
fault, and at the turn of the century deny the guilty spouse custody, has little effect
upon the custody decision. See La. Civ. Code art. 134. See also La. Civ. Code arts.
131-132.
333. La. Civ. Code art. 103 (3) (1990).
334. La. Civ. Code art. 101, comment (c) (1990). A separation from bed and
board is a possibility for a spouse in a covenant marriage. La. R.S. § 9:307(B)
(1997).
335. Ajudicial separation cannot be obtained, but the lawpermits a spouse who
is living separate and apart from the other to obtain a judicial separation ofproperty
after the spouses have lived separate and apart for six months (La. Civ. Code art.
2374(D)) and to seek custody of any children of the spouses, child support, and
spousal support. La. R.S. § 9:291 (2003).
336. See La. Civ. Code art. 98, comment (f).
337. Spaht, supra note 115, at 1156.
338. Id. at 1156, n.167.
339. La. Civ. Code art. 99 (1987).
340. La. Civ. Code art. 100 (1987): "Marriage does not change the name of
either spouse. However, a married person may use the surname of either or both
spouses as a surname."
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personal reasons; thus, to provide a list ofconduct that is grounds for
divorce could not possibly reflect every spouse's personal reason. 4t
The underlying assumption of such a statement is, ofcourse, that the
spouse who desires a divorce is the best judge of whether his or her
marriage is no longer viable, and that the public has no interest in
keeping spouses together when one spouse wants a divorce. In the
same spirit, practicing lawyers on the Persons Committee argued that
a separation from bed and board had become merely a step in the
divorcing process and that the waiting period between judgment of
separation and filing for divorce did not result in reconciliations. The
result ofthose two arguments is that the law ofseparation and divorce
which at one time spoke so eloquently to the spouses about society's
expectations for their conduct in marriage has been silenced. What
we have discovered is that spouses do not always exercise their
freedom responsibly; in fact, nationally, approximately two-thirds of
divorces are for those very personal "soft" reasons 342 - such as poor
communication, failed expectations or unmet needs, growing apart,
a change in priorities, or failing to emotionally connect 3 4 3- all of
which supports ultimately a lack of commitment to the marriage.3 "
The law permits a spouse to decide for herself if she desires to end
her marriage whether for "soft" or "hard" reasons even though the
most recent empirical evidence demonstrates that "bad marriages go
good,"
often with no other explanation than the mere passage of
34
time. 5
At the same time that the law ofmarriage was revised in 1987, the
Law Institute also proposed a Civil Code article that would have
extended to cohabitants, neither of whom were married to another,
the limited right to contract in writing.3 " Cohabitants were defined
341. For an example ofthe type ofreasons spouses give for desiring a divorce,
the top five appear in a pamphlet entitled Making MarriageLast: A Guide to
PreventingDivorce,published by the American Academy ofMatrimonial Lawyers:
poor communication, financial problems, a lack ofcommitment to the marriage, a
dramatic change in priorities, and infidelity. Id. at 3.
Other reasons include failed expectations or unmet needs; addictions and
substance abuse; physical, sexual or emotional abuse; and lack ofconflict resolution
skills. Id.
342. Paul R. Amato and Alan Booth, A GenerationatRisk: Growing Up in an
EraofFamily Upheaval(1997).
343. Bob Thompson, The Good Divorce: One Couple'sAttempt to Split Up
Without Tearingthe Kids Apart, Wash. Post Sunday Magazine, Nov. 24, 2002, at
W14.
344. See reasons contained in the pamphlet produced by the American Academy
of Matrimonial Lawyers, supranote 341.
345. Linda J. Waite, Don Browning, William J. Doherty, Maggie Gallagher, Ye
Luo, & Scott M. Stanley, Does DivorceMake People Happy? Findingsfrom a
Study of UnhappyMarriages,published by Institute for American Values (2002).
346. "An otherwise valid contract is not rendered unenforceable solely because
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in comment (c) to the proposed article as "persons who live together
in a companionate sexual relationship. '347 In the pre-1987
jurisprudence, cohabitants could contract with each other concerning
matters disassociated from their life in common, but they could not
enter into "any kind ofpartnership or similar arrangement the object
of which would be to supply the equivalent of a matrimonial
regime., 34' To do so would amount to a contract the enforcement of
which would be against public policy. 349 Louisiana law has never
conferred upon those who live in concubinage or in a cohabiting
relationship any of the rights or obligations resulting from marriage.
In fact, Louisiana law has .exacted a certain punishment of such
relationships by refusing to enforce contracts made between
cohabitants, with one fairly recent exception. The exception, created
by the repeal of a prohibition against certain donations35 ° between
those living in open concubinage, was made in the same year that
the legislature rejected the proposed article recommended by the Law
Institute. The precipitating factor in the repeal of the prohibition
against donations between concubines was Succession ofBacot,352 a
decision in which the court of appeal interpreted the relationship of
concubinage to mean only a heterosexual relationship.353 The
donation mortis causa in the Bacot case was made to a homosexual
lover of the testator. As a consequence, the legislature repealed the
prohibition believing that if concubinage did not extend to
the parties, neither of whom was married, were cohabitants at the time of
contracting but such a contract must be in writing." Proposed La. Civ. Code art.
101 (H.B. 1139 [Reg. Sess. 1987]).
See the case of In re estate of Roccamonte, N.J. A-75-01 (10/23/02), aff'd 28
FLR 1053, 1059-60 (10/29/02) in which the deceased cohabitant, a married man,
had promised lifetime support to his cohabitant and the New Jersey Supreme Court
permitted her to recover against his estate. This case went much further than the
proposed 1987 proposed legislation.
347. Spaht, supranote 115, at 1158 n.185.
348. Spaht, supranote 15, at757.
349. La. Civ. Code art. 1968 (1984). See Sparrowv. Sparrow, 231 La. 966, 93
So.2d 232 (1957); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So.2d 316 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1983).
350. A donation intervivos is a contract by definition. It requires an offer and
an acceptance. La. Civ. Code art. 1468.
351. La. Civ. Code art. 1481 (1870) (repealed by 1987 La. Acts, No. 468, § 1):
Those who have lived together in open concubinage are respectively
incapable of making to each other, whether inter vivos or mortis causa,
any donation of immovables; and if they make a donation of movables, it
can not exceed one-tenth part of the whole value of their estate. Those
who afterwards marry are excepted from this rule.
352. 502 So. 2d 1118 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
353. At least partial support for such a proposition appeared in the article itself
which lifted the prohibition if the concubines "afterwards marry" which
homosexuals are prohibited from doing. For text of article, see note [350] supra.
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homosexual relationships, then the prohibition did not reach what
constitutes for society the most offensive of sexual relationships.354
Ultimately, some years later and for different purposes, a broader
term was formulated that included homosexual and lesbian
relationships: cohabitation with another person of either sex in the
manner of married persons.355
Even though the legislature has to a very limited extent removed
one of the civil punishments of the participants in an irregular
relationship that mimics but is not marriage, this action does not
signify legislative approval of a general category of stable sexual
relationships. Nothing in the most recent legislative history, other
than repeal of the laws punishing illegitimate children 35 6 who are
considered to be only innocent victims of the cohabitation of their
parents, a5 suggests a retreat from the desirability ofchanneling sexual
relationships between a man and a woman into marriage. Marriage
continues to afford to the parties many legal privileges as an incentive
to regularize their sexual relationship. As cohabitation increases, and

354. For a discussion of the law that supports the conclusion that homosexual
relationships are considered the most offensive under the marriage law ofLouisiana,
see text at notes 188-191, supra. Nonetheless, the repeal ofArticle 1481 (1870) but
the refusal to adopt the proposed Article 101 may ultimately have some effect upon
contracts entered into between cohabitants. See Spaht, supranote 115.
355. La. Civ. Code art. 115 (1997) (extinguishment of spousal support
obligation if recipient has cohabited). Comment (e):
the phrase 'cohabited ... in the manner of married persons' means to live
together in a sexual relationship of some permanence regardless of
whether the cohabitants are prohibited from marrying. See Article 89
[prohibiting purported marriages between persons of the same sex]. It
does not mean just acts of sexual intercourse .... The phrase 'in the
manner of married persons' does not require that the cohabitants be
capable ofcontracting marriage under Chapter 1 ofTitle IV ofthis Code.
356. La. Civ. Code art. 27 (1870): "Children are legitimate or illegitimate.
Legitimate children are those who are born of a marriage lawfully contracted; and
illegitimate children are such as are born of an illicit union." Compare La. Civ.
Code art. 179 (1870 as amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1): "Legitimate
children are those who are either born or conceived during marriage or who have
been legitimated as provided hereafter." La. Civ. Code art. 180 (1870 as amended
by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1): "Illegitimate children are those who are conceived
and born out of marriage."
This phenomenon has been described elsewhere by the author in other articles,
including Spaht, supranote 87, at 733-34.
357. Victims these children are as virtually all social science studies now
substantiate. See, e.g., William J. Doherty, William A. Galston, Norval D. Glenn,
John Gottman, Barbara Markey, Howard J. Markman, Steven Nock, David
Popenoe, Gloria G. Rodriguez, Isabel V. Sawhill, Scott M. Stanley, Linda J. Waite
& Judith Wallerstein, Why MarriageMatters: Twenty-One Conclusionsfrom the
Social Sciences (Institute for American Values 2002) (succinct summary of the
consequences to the child born out of wedlock).
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it has increased fourfold since the early 1960s, 35" and the unrelenting
"gay rights" movement insists upon the right to marry 3 9 or at least to
enjoy the same legal privileges extended to spouses, attention needs
to be focused on the following issues: (1)why is marriage between a
man and woman legally privileged; 3, (2)will extension of those
privileges to other relationships in the form of recognition of "civil
unions 361or "domestic partnerships" undermine marriage; 362 and (3)
should the law contain any provisions about marriage and its
privileges, or is this a matter that should be returned to the exclusive
authority of the church.363 These issues are fundamental and will be
addressed in a subsequent article by the author.36
IV. LAW'S RETREAT COMMUNICATES A PRIVATIZATION OF
MARRIAGE AND A REPUDIATION OF THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST

This article arbitrarily limited its examination ofthe law's retreat
from the regulation of marriage to changes occurring over the last
century in one state with a strong historical connection to other
Western European countries. However, the historical trend lines
358. Id.at 7-8. "Cohabitation is not the functional equivalent ofmarriage." Id.
at 7. See also noted government professor James Q. Wilson's The Marriage
Problem: How Our Culture Has Weakened Marriage (2002).
"Cohabitation has captured the interest of U.S. family-policy experts because it
is a steadily growing phenomenon: In 1960, the Census Bureau counted fewer than
500,000 unmarried couples living together. In 2000, it reported 4.7 million
cohabiting households." Cheryl Wetzstein, CohabitationLevels Are on the Rise,
The Washington Times (National Edition), Nov. 18-24, 2002, at 13.
359. E.J. Graff, The OtherMarriageWar, in The American Prospect 30 (Spring
2002).
360. See Gallagher, supranote 6.
361. Vermont was the first state in the United States to enact "civil union"
legislation (Vermont Public Act 91, eff. July 1, 2000) in response to a dictate from
the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v. State of Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt.
1999). In the opinion, the court discusses what other countries have enacted that
is similar or the equivalent of"civil unions." See alsodiscussion ofother countries
"marriage problem" in Wilson, supranote 14, at 198 (discussing the new French
PACS).
362. Lynne Marie Kohm, How Will the Proliferation and Recognition of
Domestic PartnershipsAffect Marriage? 4 J. & Fam. Studies 105-15 (2002).
363. In the context ofthe push by gays and lesbians to obtain the right to marry
in Ottawa, Canada, the Justice Department is considering whether to abandon the
marriage and divorce business completely making marriage solely a religious
institution. Janice Tibbetts, OttawaMay Getout ofMarriage,DivorceBusiness,
Create Couples Registry, National Post (Nov. 8, 2002).
For a discussion ofwhy this solution will be returning jurisdiction over marriage
to the church, see text accompanying supranote 2.
364. The article is entitled, Revolution and CounterRevolution: The Futureof
Marriagein the Law, to be published in the Spring issue of the Loyola Law Review.
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indicate that the retreat began long before the turn of the century.365
By examining the evolution ofthe law regulating marriage over time,
it is easier to see the withdrawal of the expression of public interest
in marriage through changes in the laws ofdivorce, of the husband's
marital power over his wife as head of the family, of defenses to the
breach of a promise to marry, ofmarriages once prohibited by law, of
"good faith" in an absolutely null marriage, and of the legal content
of marriage. Over the last century, the law found significantly less to
prohibit, less to protect, and less to regulate. 366 Decisions the law
once made on behalf ofthe public interest and good morals about the
seriousness and the purpose ofmarriage-such as the destructiveness
of adultery to a marital relationship, the desirability of long-term
marriages not easily dissolved for inconsequential reasons, and the
corrosive effect of not punishing other competing irregular
relationships-were reversed or, for all practical purposes, delegated
to the spouses. Law's power as rhetoric, even if the provisions are
hortatory only, is absent from the law of marriage. By way of
contrast consider for example the law ofparental authority; children,
regardless of age, are reminded that they owe their fathers and
mothers honor and respect.367
To describe the evolution of marriage from a sacrament to a
contract as John Witte does 368 fails to accurately reflect the evolution
of marriage in the law, although it does fairly describe the evolution
of marriage in various religious denominations. The evolution of
marriage in the law proceeds further and in a more radical fashion.
Marriage in the law is no longer even a contract; 369 one spouse alone
may make the decision to dissolve the relationship. To evolve from
an institution370 that could not be terminated by the spouses37 ' to a
"relationship" that can be ended by the decision of one spouse alone
for no good or sufficient reason is a radical revolution. Furthermore,
as the law has withdrawn from regulating marriage, it is not
unreasonable for people to believe that marriage has been

365. Wilson, supranote 14.
366. For recognition ofthe same phenomenon, see George, supranote 5, at 1319.
367. La. Civ. Code art. 215.
368. Witte, supra note 1.
369. La. Civ. Code art. 1983 (1984): "Contracts have the effect of law for the
parties and may be dissolved only through the consent ofthe parties or on grounds
provided by law ... ." (emphasis added).
370. "Marriage is a virtually universal human institution." Doherty, supranote
357, at 8-9.
371. Under Louisiana law there was no divorce under general laws until 1827.
See Spaht, supranote 15, at 153.
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privatized.372 It is a relationship in which, with few exceptions, the
parties determine its content and its contours without interference by
law. Therefore, it is not unreasonable for the same people to believe
that marriage is a private relationship intended for their individual
fulfillment and satisfaction. The public's interest and, indeed, the
public purpose of marriage have been forgotten.
There are currently "hints" of a counter-revolution at both the
state and the federal level, probably in response to the steady stream
of social science data which indicate the fragile nature of marriage as
evidenced by divorce and cohabitation rates and the devastating
effects of divorce or failure to marry upon the children of this
country. 37 1 States have enacted covenant marriage legislation which
permits spouses to contract for a stronger form ofmarriage, imposing
the legal obligation to submit to counseling prior to divorce and a
more restricted "right" to divorce.3 74 Other states have enacted
legislation requiring marriage education375 and reducing the marriage
license fee ifthe bride and groom submit to pre-marital counseling. 76
Federal legislation has been introduced to repeal the marriage tax
penalty,377 and the President is recommending the dedication of $300
372. "... [W]e have spent the last thirty years 'privatizing' sexual conduct and
procreation. Can the 'privatization' of marriage itself be far behind? The answer,
ofcourse, is that the privatization of marriage is already upon us." Francis Cardinal
George, supra note 5, at 17.
Jeffrey Evans Stake and Eric Rasmussen urge the complete privatization of
marriage-i.e., permitting the parties to enter into a contract concerning their
personal relationship including under what circumstances either may end it.
Interestingly enough, part of the reason is that it will offer spouses the possibility
of making their marriage stronger and more stable than the law provides for at
present-the motivation of covenant marriage legislation. Lifting the Veil of
Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 Ind. L. J. 433 (1998). See
also Elizabeth Scott, RationalDecisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76
Va. L. Rev. 9 (1990); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a
RelationalContract,84 Va. L. Rev. 1225 (1998); and Brian Bix, Choice ofLaw
and Marriage: A Proposal, 36 Farn. L.Q. 255 (2002).
373. The social science data capsulized in Lenore J. Weitzman's The Divorce
Revolution: The Unintended Social and Economic Consequences on Women and
Children in America (1987); Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right,
The Atlantic Monthly 47 (Apr. 1993); and Wallerstein, et al, supra note 174.
Another recent publication that looks at the glass half-full rather than half-empty is
E. Mavis Hetherington & John Kelly, For Better or For Worse: Divorce
Reconsidered (2002).
374. Three states have enacted covenant marriage legislation: Louisiana,
Arizona, and Arkansas. See La. R.S. §§ 9:272-309 (1997).
375. Fla. Stats. § 1003.43(3)(i) (eff. Jan. 7, 2000).
376. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.01 (2002); Minn. Stat. § 517.08 (2001).
377. "There has always been strong support for reducing marriage tax penalties
for many two-earner families. This is a complicated task because the majority of
married couples, in fact, receive tax bonuses rather than penalties." Theodora
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million of TANF monies"' for state experimentation in programs to
promote marriage. 37 Oklahoma,38 0 West Virginia,38 ' and Arizona 382
have already aggressively undertaken such experiments. In the wake
of the enactment of covenant marriage legislation, a coalition of
national Christian ministries announced a religious covenant marriage
movement; and Marriage Savers, an organization that promotes and
assists ministers in U.S. cities to sign Community Marriage
Agreements,383 recently welcomed its 164th city. In an effort to
provide intellectual underpinnings and arguments for these disparate
grassroots initiatives, the Institute for American Values located in
Ooms, MarriagePlus, The American Prospect 7 (Spring 2002).
378. TANF means Temporary Assistance to Needy Families which is the
program that replaced welfare legislation in 1994 and has resulted in enormous
savings in welfare funds. See an entire issue ofThe American Prospect entitled The
Politics of Family (Spring 2002). Pay special attention to Theodora Ooms,
MarriagePlus, at 4-7.
379. In the 1994 Welfare Reform legislation, three of the four purposes for
which the money saved in welfare at the state level could be used involved the
promotion oftwo-parent families and marriage: "The law exhorts states to promote
'job preparation, work and marriage,' to 'prevent and reduce the incidence ofoutof-wedlock pregnancies,' and to 'encourage the formation and maintenance oftwoparent families."' Id. at 4.
380. Oklahoma used ten million dollars of TANF funds to initiate a series of
programs devoted to strengthening marriage for the purpose ofreducing the divorce
rate in Oklahoma by one-third by 2010. For a summary of what states are doing to
promote marriage in a preliminary report, see StatePoliciesto PromoteMarriage,
compiled by the Department of Health and Human Services, available at
http://aspc.hhs.gov/hsp/marriage02/marr-rpt.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002). See
also Mary Parke & Theodora Ooms, More Than a DatingService? StateActivities
Designedto Strengthenand PromoteMarriage,Center for Law and Social Policy
(CLASP), Policy Brief No. 2 (Oct. 2002).
381. "In West Virginia the state has spent $12.8 million to give 128,497 married
couples an extra $100 a month in their welfare checks." Cheryl Wetzstein, Welfare
PromotesMarriage,The Washington Times, Sept. 16, 2002, at AO 1. See also
report of DHHS, supra note 380 and CLASP Policy Brief, supranote 380.
382. Arizona dedicated more than one million dollars of TANF money to offer
marriage-education classes that emphasize communication skills to Arizona
residents. Wetzstein, supranote 381. See also report of DHHS, supra note 380
and CLASP Policy Brief, supranote 380.
383. A Community Marriage Agreement is an agreement signed by clergy in a
particular community in which all agree to require certain minimum instructions for
all couples marrying in their churches. Typically, the clergy agree to a minimum
waiting period before the ceremony that varies anywhere from four to six months,
a minimum number of sessions with the minister, a pre-marital inventory and
assessment (like PREPARE or FOCCUS), and mentoring couples in each
congregation. Community Marriage Agreements exist in Louisiana for Baton
Rouge, Shreveport, the Greater Rapides Parish area, and Bogalousa. Other
Louisiana cities are in the process of organizing such agreements. Information on
Community Marriage Agreements exists at www.marriagesavers.org (last visited
Oct. 15, 2002).
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New York City served as a catalyst for the formation of a National
Marriage Movement, which has thus far issued three publications.3 4
There are signs of a reversal in our cultural patterns 385-a higher
birth rate, which had dropped precipitously during the 80s and 90s;
significant improvement in the teenage pregnancy rate and in the
number of teenagers who are sexually active, both through
abstinence programs in part; a leveling off of the divorce rate,
although admittedly at historically high levels; and an improvement
in the number of African American children born to married
parents. Not everyone is enthusiastic about the nascent counter
revolution.3 86 While acknowledging that the nuclear family is
extremely important,38 7 Carl F. Horowitz, a Washington area
domestic policy consultant, argues that the doomsayers leading the
marriage movement, especially those who lament the
"skyrocketing" divorce rates like Maggie Gallagher, Pat Fagan, and
Allan Carlson, are manufacturing "an aura of crisis. 388 Kim Gandy,
the president of the National Organization for Women and
adamantly opposed to President Bush's welfare marriage initiative,
argues: "To make 'finding a man' the administration-approved
ticket out of poverty is not just an insulting throwback; it's terrible
public policy. 38 9 But those participants interviewed in Arizona and
Oklahoma, who had availed themselves of the marriage education
programs, claim in an article by Cheryl Wetzstein in The
Washington Times to have benefitted from them.39 ° Ms. Gandy's
articulated formulation of the President's goal is, of course,
hyperbole and also inaccurate. At the same time that Ms. Gandy is
expressing her disgust at a public strategy that includes encouraging
marriage, other young American women are asking why their
384. The Marriage Movement: A Statement ofPrinciples (2000), Why Marriage
Matters: Twenty-One Conclusionsfrom theSocial Sciences(2002), Does Divorce
Make People Happy? Findings from a Study of Unhappy Marriages (2002).
385. The cultural challenge is not to be underestimated. See Wilson, supra note
14, at 197 (Chapter 9: The Cultural Challenge).
386. For example, see Stephanie Coontz, Nostalgia as Ideology and Cara
Feinberg, Hitting Home, in The American Prospect at 4 and 10, respectively
(Spring 2002).
387. Carl F. Horowitz, The Collapsing Nuclear Family: Inventing a Crisis, The
Women's Freedom Network Newsletter 4, 6 (July/Aug. 2002): "Very few people
would deny the importance of the nuclear family as a socializing institution.
Despite all its flaws-human nature itself being flawed-it remains the best
alternative ofensuring children receive financial support and emotional guidance."
388. Id.: "The idea that family breakdown can serve as a meta-explanation for
the ills of America and the rest of the modem world is questionable to begin with.
But those who create hobgoblins of collapse through statistical sleight of hand
ought to be seen as reprehensible, not simply misguided."
389. Wetzstein, supranote 381.

390. Id.
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mothers did not tell them about marriage and having children at a
younger age"' before it is too late.392
V. CONCLUSION

Even by its absence, law can shape culture in destructive ways. 3
When law retreats from the regulation and protection of a key
institution like marriage,394 it communicates that there no longer is a
public interest3 95 in assuring the careful and deliberative entry into
marriage. The law's regulation communicated that marriage was a
relationship intended to last for life and to produce and nurture
children. Law's retreat means that "individuals are 'free' to confront
the non-legal structures of society; be it an unforgiving system of
unregulated exchange that may... virtually invite the exploitation of
labor, or the vacuum which previously was inhabited by a proper care
for public morality."39' 6 It "may very well leave upright persons,
families, and institutions of civil society vulnerable to a massive,
objective framework of settled understandings and expectations-a
culture which, though it is destructive and debilitating, they lack the
effective resources to resist."'3 97 Even if they do resist, "there may
well be informal... sanctions and penalties of ostracism, rejection,
and stigma. '398 Any sort of custom related to marriage, such as
monogamy or permanence, necessarily requires "a culture" that
supports it; "monogamy... cannot be practiced by an individual. 399
Culture does not exist in a legal vacuum ....For law is
necessary to civilization, and even the absence of law-the
choice to omit or remove legal regulation in some area of
cultural life-shapes culture, for better or for worse ....
Alone, it cannot cure moral defects in a people. It can,
however, change people's sense of their hierarchy of values
391. Danielle Crittendon, What Our Mothers Didn't Tell Us: Why Happiness
Eludes the Modem Woman (1999).
392. Sylvia Ann Hewlett, Creating A Life: Professional Women and the Quest
for Children (2002).
393. Francis Cardinal George, supranote 5, at 14.
394. Jeff Johnson, JournalistCalls MarriageSociety's "Key Institution,"The
Wanderer 1 (Nov. 14, 2002). That journalist was Maggie Gallagher. See also
Schneider, supranote 2.
395. "Law's expressive abilities may be used, first, to providea voice in which
citizens may speakand, second, to alter the behavior of people the law addresses."
The expressive function deploys the law's power to impart ideas. Schneider, supra
note 11.
396. Francis Cardinal George, supranote 5, at 14.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 15.
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and of what finally falls out of the realm of acceptable
behavior. Law teaches more than it prevents.'
What our law, both in Louisiana and elsewhere in the United
States, teaches about marriage needs revision desperately-a revision
that reinvigorates, strengthens, and protects the most fundamental of
human institutions. The need for reinvigoration in law of the
traditional understanding ofmarriage is pressing; it maybe the only
way Americans can resist other ideas inimical to and destructive of
the institution of marriage. The time is now to get about this most
difficult yet crucial task.

400. Id. at 18-19. See also Schneider, supranote 2 and Schneider, supranote
11.
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APPENDIX A
EULOGY FOR LEE HARGRAVE
KatherineShaw Spaht
St. Joseph's Cathedral, Baton Rouge, LA
November 18, 2002
Lee was the consummate teacher and I was his student from my
first day of class at the LSU Law School in the fall of 1968, literally
until the moment of his death. Many of you here had the same
experience.
In the fall of 1968, he taught me the principles of civil law
property through a masterful combination of statutes and cases
illuminated by well-planned and creative hypotheticals.
But he taught me so much more-appreciation for a teacher's
being thoroughly prepared, being engaged in dialogue with his
students, being intellectually concentrated for the entire class hour,
and being genuinely excited about the subject matter and the students'
responses to it.
In the fall of 1969, as a student research assistant for Frank
Sullivan, I was taught by Lee the pleasure of taking his research,
queries sent from South Vietnam and finding answers to his novel
questions about the creation ofa system ofcourts where access made
possible the pursuit ofjustice for ordinary Vietnamese citizens.
In 1974, he taught me about the incomparable satisfaction of
serving the State ofLouisiana and its people he so dearly loved, with
devotion in a selfless task that will remain as his enduring
legacy-the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
From 1986 to 1989, he taught me about the self discipline
required for research and writing, about the importance of a cleared
desk (the symbol of a clear mind), about concise descriptions of the
law which contained the essence of truth and were all the more
powerful for their brevity, and about the deep inter-dependency of
those who collaborate together to produce a teaching tool and an
authoritative work to serve our chosen profession.
In 2000, he taught me in retiring about recognizing when one task
is finished and another begins.
In 2002, he taught me about suffering and about the courage to
accept it with grace.
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In all of it-all of those 34 years I knew Lee Hargrave--he taught
me that:
(1) a really good marriage comes from choosing well an equal
partner for life;
(2) institutional memory and the very history ofthe institution
itself is important;
(3) the true intellectual brilliance of a prodigy is reflected in
the humility of never forgetting where you came from;
(4) triumph over those who wish you ill comes not in some
vengeful act but in living and loving well;
(5) the joy of living is offered each day, so never miss an
opportunity to seize it in the company of family and friends;
(6) laughter is music that heals both anger and profound
sadness.
Much ofthis I wrote him on Wednesday night to be delivered this
past Saturday. On Friday afternoon, with a heavy heart, I left that
missive to him in a plain paper bag by his front door. But as I was
leaving, a gust ofwind stirred the wind chimes on his front porch and
the air was filled with music.
Not to worry, I said to myself, he had already read it.
In the words of the greatest teacher the world has ever
known-"Well done thou good and faithful servant, enter thou into the
joyofthyLord." Matt. 25:21.

